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I.

Introduction

In everyday discourse, the label “environmental law” signifies a
distinct and unique area of law.1 Journalists, activists, and industry
representatives speak, for example, about the Bush Administration’s record
∗
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the Washington University School of Law in St. Louis for extremely helpful comments on a
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1 See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. LAND USE &
ENV’TL. L. 213, 215 (“What we now call environmental law is very much embedded in the
legal landscape.”).

Forthcoming in the George Washington Law Review
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on “environmental law,”2 the Supreme Court’s “environmental law” cases,3
and Congress’ “environmental law” activities.4 Likewise, in the context of
the law school curriculum, “environmental law” stands for something unique
and distinct. On law school campuses across the country, students take
courses in “environmental law,”5 join journals devoted to “environmental
law,”6 and elect concentrations in “environmental law.”7 Indeed, even the
esteemed8 U.S. News and World Report rankings contain a separate entry for
“environmental law” programs.9

See, e.g., Mark Grossi, Norton Stops by Yosemite; Interior Secretary Defends Restoration, FRESNO
BEE, Apr. 23, 2004, at A1, available at 2004 WL 65880963 (“Environmentalists, who say
Bush is attempting to dismantle decades of environmental law, also attended the Earth Day
event.”); Perspective, NEWS JOURNAL, Dec. 21, 2003, at 10, available at 2003 WL 64628779 (“It
seems that under President Bush, environmental law gets bent as a substitute for a truly
forward-looking national energy policy.”);
3 Lee Davidson, Green Groups Back Suit by SUWA, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Feb. 26, 2004,
at B3, available at 2004 WL 70641690 (“A virtual Who’s Who of environmental groups—plus
14 state governments—are arguing in briefs that federal environmental law would be
completely undermined if the U.S. Supreme Court overturns a Utah case now before it.”);
Frank Davies, Court Hears Glades Dispute, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 15, 2004, at 6, available at 2004
WL 56366284 (“The Supreme Court on Wednesday wrestled with environmental law . . . in
an Everglades dispute between the Miccosukee Tribe and South Florida water managers.”);
4 John Cornyn, A Broken Tradition: Time to Reform Senate Rules on Filibusters, WASH. TIMES, June
5, 2003, at A21, available at 2003 WL 7712469 (“The Senate has previously considered at least
30 proposals to eliminate filibusters altogether. In fact, there are dozens of laws on the
books that prevent a minority of senators from delaying action in certain areas . . . covering
such diverse subjects as . . . environmental law.”); Environmental Law Expert to Present Salmon
Lecture, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Nov. 11, 2001, at 2K, available at 2001 WL 27638936
(reporting that William H. Rodgers, Jr., “who frequently testifies before Congress on
environmental law matters” will be giving a lecture on protecting salmon); David L. Markell
& Martha F. Kellogg, States on the Rise: National Interests Don’t Have to Suffer as the Pendulum of
Power Swings Away, For Now, From the Federal Government, TIMES UNION, Feb. 4, 2001, at B1
(“In the environmental area, for example, during the 1970s, Congress enacted an alphabet
soup of regulatory and other statutes intended to federalize environmental law.”).
5 See, e.g., http://www.law.umaryland.edu/Environment/courses.asp (linking to a list of
environmental law courses offered at the University of Maryland).
6
See,
e.g.,
the
websites
for
the
Ecology
Law
Quarterly,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journals/elq/, the Stanford Environmental Law Journal,
http://elj.stanford.edu/elj/, and the Harvard Environmental Law Review,
http://www.law.harvard.edu/students/orgs/elr/.
7 See, e.g., http://www.ggu.edu/schools/law/graduates/environment (describing Golden
Gate
Law
School’s
LL.M.
program
in
environmental
law);
http://www.law.washington.edu/Students/Academics/ct
Environmental.html (describing the University of Washington’s environmental law
concentration); http://www.als.edu/departments/editor.cfm?ID=415 (describing Albany
Law School’s environmental law concentration).
8 But see Brian Leiter, The U.S. News Law School Rankings: A Guide for the Perplexed,
http://www.utexas.edu/law/faculty/bleiter/rankings/guide.html (May 2003) (noting that
the rankings are “meaningless”).
9
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/grad/rankings/law/brief/lawsp03_brief.php
(listing top environmental law programs). For more examples of the legal profession and
academy’s treatment of environmental law as a unique subject, see Tarlock, supra n. 1, at 216
(pointing to, among other things, environmental law’s “own West key number,” what
Tarlock calls “the ultimate recognition” for environmental law).
2
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But in what sense, exactly, is environmental law different from both
the general areas of law (particularly administrative law, but also corporate
law, constitutional law, and others) in which environmental issues arise and
other specific areas of law (e.g., employment law, securities law) that parallel
it?10 The uniqueness of environmental law stems most obviously from the
subject matter of environmental legislation and regulation. Environmental
law deals with the protection of the natural environment—with the control
of air and water pollution, the management of hazardous wastes, and the
protection of public natural resources such as land and biodiversity—while
employment law and securities law, for example, deal respectively with
regulating the relationship between employers and employees and regulating
the functioning of securities markets. But does environmental law also differ
from other areas of law with respect to how judges ought to approach
deciding cases? In other words, should judges act differently somehow when
they are deciding an environmental law case as opposed to, for example, a
labor law or banking law case? At least one influential scholar has argued
that the distinctive features of ecological injury justify treating environmental
cases differently from other types of cases.11 Nonetheless, at first glance, it is
For a sophisticated look at the question of environmental law’s uniqueness from a variety
of angles, see Tarlock, supra n. 1. There is a long history within legal scholarship of analyzing
the relevant level of generality for identifying areas of legal inquiry. For a sampling of
relevant literature, see, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1889); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codification and Scientific Classification of the
Law, in JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, HIS BOOK NOTICES AND UNCOLLECTED
LETTERS AND PAPERS 59 (Harry C. Shriver, ed. 1936); Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and
the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F 207 (1996); Frederick Schauer, Prediction and
Particularity, 78 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1998); Mark A. Hall & Carl E. Schneider, Where is the
“There” in Health Law? Can It Become a Coherent Field, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 101 (2004).
11 See Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 706-07 (2000) [hereinafter Lazarus, Restoring What’s
Environmental]. Although I owe much to the excellent work of Richard Lazarus, one of the
leading environmental law scholars and practitioners in the country, see, e.g., text
accompanying notes 43-53, infra (describing Lazarus’s account of the distinct features of
ecological injury), in many ways this Article stands as a counterpoint to his influential
arguments. In a book and a series of articles, Lazarus has argued for the uniqueness of
environmental law. In addition to the article cited above in this footnote, see also RICHARD
J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2004); Richard J. Lazarus, Thirty Years
of Environmental Protection Law in the Supreme Court, 17 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL L. REV. 1
(1999) [hereinafter Lazarus, Thirty Years]; Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law and the
Supreme Court: Three Years Later, 2002 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL L. REV. 653 (2002) [hereinafter
Lazarus, Three Years Later]; Richard J. Lazarus, Survey Says: Court Doesn’t Get It, ENVTL. F.,
Jan./Feb. 2000, at 44; Richard J. Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, 18 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 201
(2004). Specifically with respect to the judicial role and environmental law, Lazarus has
argued that the Supreme Court has wrongly failed to “appreciate[e] environmental law as a
distinct area of law.” Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra, at 706. Lazarus concedes
that some “stripping of the ‘environment’ out of environmental law is . . . an appropriate
development,” Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra, at 635, since the Court has a responsibility to
reach consistent results in the underlying areas of law within which environmental problems
arise (e.g., administrative law, constitutional law governing federal-state relations), id., but he
argues that “[e]nvironmental protection concerns” ought “always to remain a relevant factor
for separate consideration” and “a dispositive factor . . . in some instances.” Id. This article,
to the contrary, argues that, in large part, courts rightly treat environmental law primarily as a
10
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by no means clear that the judicial role ought to differ depending on the
subject matter being protected or regulated by legislation or administrative
action. If the judicial role should differ, it is important to understand why it
ought to differ, how it ought to differ, and whether it in fact has differed.
To answer these important questions, scholars must clarify, with
some specificity, what it would mean for courts to treat environmental law as
a distinct area of law. Although scholars have produced some excellent work
focusing on the nature of environmental law decision-making,12 no such
specific attempt to chart the relationship between environmental law and
administrative law (and other general areas of law) exists in the scholarly
literature.13 This Article seeks to fill this gap by describing and evaluating
seven unique paradigms that federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
could adopt when deciding environmental law cases. Specifically, courts
might: (1) supplant generally applicable principles from other areas of law
with principles applicable only to environmental law; (2) retain general
principles from other areas of law but apply them in a special manner in
environmental law cases; (3) shape general principles of law through an
understanding of environmental problems; (4) pay strong attention to the
factual nuances of environmental problems when applying facts to general
principles of law; (5) apply general principles of law to environmental law
problems but employ environment-related rhetoric or provide advice relating
to environmental protection; (6) decide environmental law cases on the basis
of preferred outcome regarding the environment; or (7) apply generally
applicable legal principles without any special concern for the environmental
aspects of the case.14
subset of administrative law rather than as a radically unique or distinct area of law all to
itself.
12 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Is the Supreme Court Irrelevant? Reflections on the Judicial Role in
Environmental Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 547 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme Court has not
played and important or effective role in the environmental law area); Harold Leventhal,
Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 509 (1974); Richard
E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Judicial Activism and Restraint in the Supreme Court’s
Environmental Law Decisions, 42 VAND. L. REV. 343, 346 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme
Court “has pursued a policy far less protective of the environment than the policy intended
by Congress”). Most importantly, see also the work published by Richard Lazarus, supra n.
11.
13 Richard Lazarus has defended at length his claim that the Supreme Court fails to treat
environmental law as anything more than a subset of administrative law, and in the course of
his analysis, he certainly discusses in passing various ways that the Court should understand
the distinctiveness of environmental law as the field compares to administrative law. See
generally the works cited in n. 11, supra; n. 196, infra. In my view, however, he does not
systematically chart and categorize the various possible relationships between environmental
law and administrative law (or other general areas of law).
14 Although the Article will have much to say about each of these paradigms later on, for
clarity it is worth giving some brief examples of the paradigms here:
(1) In administrative law, there is a general rule that courts may not review agency
decisions not to enforce statutes. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
Under the first paradigm, a court might apply a special rule just in environmental
law cases in which it would review decisions not to enforce.
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As the Article further argues, courts should acknowledge the unique
nature of environmental law problems to some limited extent by foregoing
option #7 and employing options #3 and #4 (and perhaps option #5) when
the legal and factual circumstances of the case justify special consideration of
the environment, but should refrain from any more radical treatment of
environmental law as a unique area of law. In other words, when relevant
under the appropriate legal standards, courts should consider the distinctive
features of ecological injury when applying facts to law,15 and in some
situations they should draw on their knowledge of those distinctive features
when fashioning rules of general application. They should not, however,
reach pro-environment decisions in a non-principled manner, automatically
vote to protect the environment whenever the relevant legal materials prove
substantially indeterminate, or otherwise act as though protection of the
(2) In administrative law, courts review agency decisions to make sure they are not
“arbitrary and capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). Sometimes this analysis can be very
deferential; other times it is surprisingly demanding. Under the second paradigm,
courts might say that the arbitrary and capricious standard will be particularly
demanding in environmental law cases.
(3) This paradigm goes to the time of rule formation, rather than the time of rule
application. For example, when the Supreme Court was considering what the
proper test should be for Article III standing, this paradigm would have had the
Court consider not just the text of the Constitution and its structure and history,
but also the environmental consequences that would likely have resulted from
adopting any particular rule.
(4) According to some scholars, environmental harms are distinctive when compared
to the harms encountered in other areas of law. See, e.g., text accompanying notes
43-53, infra (discussing one scholar’s views regarding ecological injury). This
paradigm would require courts to understand and acknowledge those distinctive
features when applying facts to law. For example, some legal tests require courts to
balance the government’s interest in taking a certain action against the private
interests threatened by that action. See text accompanying notes 157-162, infra
(describing test for procedural due process). In cases involving government action
to protect the environment that infringes on private interests, this paradigm would
call upon courts to understand and acknowledge that the environmental harms
sought to be prevented may be particularly weighty due to their irreversible and
potentially catastrophic nature.
(5) This paradigm would sanction in at least some form the use of environmental
rhetoric and advice in judicial opinions, which could include anything from
chastising Congress for not protecting the environment; long descriptions of water
or air pollution; or pointing out how a particular provision will have real world
effects on the environment that were not anticipated.
(6) This paradigm would have courts reach decisions in environmental cases that
would promote their preferred outcome. Therefore, if a judge thinks protecting
the environment is a good idea from a policy perspective, that judge should simply
vote for the side of the case that will best protect the environment. There are some
important variations on this paradigm that are discussed at length below, the most
important of which may be to vote to protect the environment whenever a case
presents significant indeterminacy.
(7) This paradigm would have courts treat environmental cases in just the same way
they treat any other case.
15 See text accompanying notes 43-53, infra (describing Richard Lazarus’s account of the
distinctive features of ecological injury).
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environment is an inherent aspect of the judicial role. Nor should they
fashion completely distinct rules to govern environmental law cases or alter
generally applicable rules to apply differently in environmental law cases.
Certain types of judicial rhetoric or advice regarding the environment are
proper, but there is no principled reason to distinguish the use of proenvironment language in environmental law cases from language critiquing
environmental regulation if some judge believes such language is appropriate.
This balanced view of the responsibilities of judges in environmental
law cases flows from a similarly balanced vision of the judicial role generally.
As the Article suggests, although judges should always strive to implement
the intentions of the popularly elected Congress when those intentions are
made clear by the relevant legal materials, they should also feel free to look to
a variety of other factors, including the potential consequences of their
decisions, when seeking to apply legal materials that involve some significant
amount of indeterminacy.
Nonetheless, this invitation to consider
consequences along with a host of other relevant factors is not at the same
time an invitation simply to decide cases in order to reach preferred
outcomes, even in cases involving substantial indeterminacy. Indeed, it is
unlikely that any theory would adequately justify such outcome-focused
decision-making in environmental law cases. Furthermore, as the Article
explains, judges are obligated to apply facts faithfully and to use non-binding
language only when its purpose is closely related to the strengths and
obligations of the judiciary in its role as one of three coordinate branches of
the federal government.
The Article proceeds in two main parts. In Part II, the Article points
the way toward a refined framework for thinking about environmental law by
describing seven ways that courts can relate environmental law to other areas
of law. It then illustrates these seven methodologies through consideration
of the Court’s 1985 decision in Chemical Manufacturer’s Association v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.16 Next, Part III explains which of the seven
paradigms or methodologies courts should employ and which they should
avoid, and it then returns to Chemical Manufacturer’s Association and explains
why it was in fact correctly decided. Finally, the Article concludes by
observing that regardless of the proper nature of the judicial role in
environmental law cases, “environmental law” should still be considered a
distinct area of law due to the unique nature of its subject matter and the
critical problems it seeks to solve.

470 U.S. 116 (1985). As described below, I have chosen to discuss this case in particular
because Richard Lazarus, who has argued at length for the uniqueness of environmental law,
see n. 11, supra, discusses and criticizes the case numerous times in his work. See, e.g., Lazarus,
Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 711-12, 742. My evaluation of the Court’s
decision and reasoning in the case differs sharply from Lazarus’s. See text accompanying
notes 219-253, infra.
16
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II.

Seven Judicial Paradigms for Environmental Law

Should judges treat environmental law cases differently from other
types of administrative law cases?17 It is impossible even to begin answering
this question without seriously considering the various ways that judges could
potentially relate environmental law to administrative law and other areas of
law within which environmental cases arise. In this Part, the Article takes a
first step towards answering the question by sketching out a systematic way
of thinking about the relationship between environmental law and more
general areas of law such as administrative law, from the perspective of
judicial decision-making. In subparts 1-7, the Article identifies and briefly
describes seven possible judicial paradigms that courts could use when
relating environmental law to the broader, so-called “crosscutting”18 areas of
law in which environmental issues arise. In subpart 8, the Article illustrates
more specifically these seven paradigms by explaining how they might have
affected the Court’s decision-making in an important case from the mid1980s called Chemical Manufacturer’s Association v. National Resources Defense
Council.19 Later, in Part III, the Article will provide a normative analysis of
these paradigms.
1.

Apply Special Rules in Environmental Cases.

Within long-standing crosscutting areas of federal law such as
administrative law, constitutional law, and the law governing access to federal
courts, Congress and the courts have developed all manner of general legal
principles or rules that purportedly apply regardless of the factual context of
the case being decided.
For example, in administrative law, the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides that courts must review
agency actions of all sorts using the familiar “arbitrary and capricious”
17 This is a very different question from asking whether policymakers ought to take a different
theoretical approach to dealing with environmental problems. One example of an important
debate over this separate issue is the question of whether policymakers ought to apply the
so-called “precautionary principle” to dealing with environmental problems. See, e.g., Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003); David A. Dana, A
Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315 (2003).
Although one might argue that American judges ought to apply the principle when deciding
environmental law cases, it would seem that such a controversial decision rightfully belongs
to elected representatives rather than judges acting alone.
Indeed, it is certainly the case that environmental statutes do deal with
environmental problems in ways that seem unique as compared to other areas of law. For
example, they often divide responsibilities between the federal government and the states
(so-called “cooperative federalism”), require agencies to consider the environmental effects
of their action before deciding what to do, require mitigation of negative effects, and require
agencies to consider alternatives to their planned action (or the action of private parties
seeking government approval), etc. Whether these characteristics of environmental statutes
appropriately respond to the remarkable features of ecological injury is an interesting
question (or set of questions), but not the topic of this Article.
18 The term “crosscutting” comes from Lazarus. See Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental,
supra n. 11, at 740.
19 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
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standard.20 Absent some more specific statutory command to the contrary,21
the arbitrary and capricious standard applies to all agency actions, regardless
of the subject matter of that action—in other words, regardless of whether
the agency is regulating the environment, food and drug safety, sale of
securities, labor-management relations, or the like.22 Other general principles
applied by courts in the area of administrative law include deferring to
reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes23 (at least when
those interpretations are the product of some kind of relatively formal
decision-making process24), refusing to review agency decisions not to
enforce statutes under their administration against alleged violators,25 and
requiring that changes made by agencies between the time of issuing a
proposed rule and a final rule represent logical outgrowths of the proposed
rule.26
In the area of constitutional law, courts have adopted similar general
principles. Government action, for example, that intentionally discriminates
on the basis of race, receives so-called strict scrutiny under the Equal

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
For example, section 309(g)(8) of the Clean Water Act specifically provides that
administrative civil penalty orders issued by the EPA for violations of the Act are reviewable
under a substantial evidence standard rather than the arbitrary and capricious standard. 33
U.S.C. § 1319(g)(8) (“Such court shall not set aside or remand such order unless there is not
substantial evidence in the record, taken as a whole, to support the finding of a violation.”).
22 The APA judicial review provisions apply to all “agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The
APA defines agency very broadly. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (defining “agency” as “each authority of
the Government of the United States” other than Congress, the courts, and a few other
limited categories).
Although the APA supplies the default rules for review of agency action, specific
organic statutes can override the APA and provide their own standards of review, as well as
their own procedures for agency decision-making. Indeed, some environmental statutes,
including the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act at times do exactly that. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.
§ 7413 (d)(4) (providing for substantial evidence review of civil penalties under Clean Air
Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (g)(8) (same, under Clean Water Act). At some point, if specific
environmental law statutes so significantly provided different standards of review and
different procedural requirements for agency decision-making, it might be possible to
conclude that Congress has itself determined that environmental law ought to be treated
differently from other areas of law, and therefore it would follow that courts ought to do so
as well. In my view, however, this threshold has not been reached in environmental statutes
generally.
23 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 476 U.S. 837 (1984)
(holding that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous
statutes).
24 See United States v. Mead Corporation, 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (“We hold that
administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law . . . . Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety
of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking.”).
25 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
26 See, e.g., Chocolate Manufacturers Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098 (4th Cir. 1985).
20
21
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Protection Clause,27 while state action that only incidentally causes
disproportionately harmful effects on some particular racial group does not
receive such review.28 Likewise, government action that infringes upon some
fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause,29
while run-of-the-mill state action that regulates economic activity receives
only rational basis scrutiny.30 These levels of judicial review apply regardless
of the factual area of law in which the government acts—state action that
causes disparate racial impacts in the environmental area receives the same
rational basis review as state action causing disparate racial impacts in the
workplace.
Finally, the numerous access-limiting doctrines in the field of federal
courts—ripeness,31 mootness,32 standing,33 and exhaustion34—that courts
have developed to ensure that the cases they hear are best fit for judicial
review35 apply regardless of the case’s factual context. For example, the
Supreme Court’s classic Abbott Laboratories36 two part test for ripeness—that
the challenged administrative action be fit for judicial review and be causing
hardship to the plaintiffs37—applies whether the action is in the area of food
and drug law, occupational safety, or social security administration. The
same is true for other of these doctrinal rules, including the so-called “zone
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003) (“We have held that all racial
classifications imposed by government ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict
scrutiny.’) (citations omitted).
28 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (“Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by
the Constitution. Standing alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications are
to be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations.”).
29 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (“Where certain ‘fundamental rights’ are
involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights may be justified only by a
‘compelling state interest,’ . . . and that legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to
express only the legitimate state interests at stake.”) (citations omitted).
30 See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (“The day is gone
when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down
state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought.”).
31 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967) (noting that the ripeness
inquiry requires the Court “to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and
the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration”).
32 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
167, 189-94 (2000) (rejecting claim that plaintiff’s lawsuit had become moot because of
defendant’s voluntary post-suit activities).
33 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Though some of its
elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government,
the core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-orcontroversy requirement of Article III.”).
34 See McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140 (1992) (describing exhaustion doctrine).
35 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 44 (2d ed. 1994) (“[T]he justiciability
doctrines are intended to improve judicial decision-making by providing the federal courts
with concrete controversies best suited for judicial resolution.”).
36 387 U.S. 136.
37 Id. at 149.
27
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of interests” rule in the standing area, which limits plaintiffs to bringing
claims to enforce interests “arguably within the zone of interests to be
protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question,”38 and the “capable of repetition but avoiding review” exception to
the mootness doctrine.39
One paradigm for judicial decision-making in environmental law
would be for courts to supplant these general rules with new rules applicable
only to environmental law cases.40 For example, in the administrative law
context, courts could hold that although agencies may generally make
changes between their proposed rules and final rules so long as the changes
represent logical outgrowths of the proposed rules, changes to environmental
regulations must meet some much higher standard for them to have legal
effect absent the agency opening up a new notice and comment period.41 Or,
similarly, a court might hold that although agency decisions not to enforce
statutes under their administration are generally not reviewable, a decision by
the EPA (or the Interior Department, or other environmental agency) not to
enforce a requirement established by some environmental regulation or
statute, can be reviewed, under some new, and possibly stringent standard
articulated by the court. In other areas of law, likewise, a court might hold
that environmental decisions that have unintentional disparate racial impacts
(like a decision to site a so-called “locally undesirable land use” or “LULU”
in a minority neighborhood42) should be subject to strict scrutiny even
though such state actions are generally subject only to rational basis law. Or,
they might supplant the Abbott Labs ripeness test with a far more lenient test
to govern pre-enforcement review of environmental regulations.
Stronger and weaker versions of this paradigm can be imagined. A
strong version might hold that courts should presume that a different rule
will apply in environmental cases than in other areas of regulatory law. A
weaker version might hold that the general principle will be the default rule
unless the court finds that certain, specified conditions are met. These
conditions, moreover, could themselves be more or less easily met. For
example, one standard might be that the general rule will apply unless the
court finds that application of that rule “will more likely than not result in the
Association of Data Processing Services v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 318 (1988) (noting that plaintiff’s claim would not be
moot if the conduct complained of would be capable of repetition but evading review).
40 Courts have in fact at times adopted special rules for other areas of law, such as federal
Indian law, immigration law, water law, criminal law, and others. These instances of special
rules are discussed below, see text accompanying note 129, infra.
41 In the course of my discussion here I will assume for the sake of ease and clarity that a
court seeking to treat environmental interests in a special manner would treat them favorably
in an effort to protect the environment rather than discounting them to protect industry or
other interests. However, as a principled matter my discussion would extend to both kinds
of special treatment.
42 For comprehensive analysis of this phenomenon, see Vicki Been, What’s Fairness Got To Do
With It? Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. REV.
1101 (1993).
38
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degradation of environmental values.” A more stringent standard might
instead require the court to find with “substantial certitude” that the general
rule “will result in significant environmental harm endangering the lives or
safety of a substantial population of people.”
Why might courts want to apply different rules in environmental
cases than in other types of cases? One possibility is suggested by Professor
Richard Lazarus’s compelling analysis of what he calls the “distinctive”
features of ecological injury.43 In his view, it is the nature of ecological injury
that most markedly distinguishes the types of problems environmental law
addresses from the types of problems addressed by other areas of law.
Lazarus argues that: “Ecological injury has several recurring features that
render its redress through law especially difficult. These pertain to both the
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ of such injury, each of which inevitably becomes a
regulatory touchstone in any legal regime for environmental protection.”44
To begin with, Lazarus argues that the impact of ecological injury
itself can be particularly significant, in the sense of being “irreversible,”
“catastrophic,” and “continuing.”45 He also suggests that ecological injury is
often experienced geographically or temporally far away from the event that
caused the injury, making environmental harms very difficult to control.46
Additionally, Lazarus identifies several difficulties in tracing the causation of
ecological injury. Specifically, he notes that the “sheer complexity of the
natural environment” makes it difficult in many instances to understand what
exactly causes environmental injuries,47 a problem that is exacerbated by the
fact that environmental harms “are more typically the cumulative and
synergistic result of multiple actions”48 than the result of a single action.
Finally, Lazarus argues that ecological injuries are unique because they are
not always subject to the same type of “ready monetary valuation” as other
types of harms.49
Natural resources are “distinctively nonhuman,”
“nonexclusive,” and protected often “notwithstanding any notion of
economic value.”50 Because natural resources are difficult (or impossible) to
value using traditional market-based formulae or mechanisms, the regulatory
state, which often employs some sort of cost-benefit analysis to determine
which risks to regulate,51 faces difficult challenges in handling these kinds of
See Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 744-48.
Id. at 745.
45 Id. As examples, he points to such injuries as the destruction of a drinking water aquifer,
the erosion of the ozone layer, and a gradually expanding oil spill, that are both highly costly
and extremely challenging to any legal system that acts incrementally and deliberatively. See
id. at 745-46.
46 Id. at 745-47.
47 Id. at 747.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 748.
50 Id. at 748.
51 See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,866 (requiring federal agencies to consider costs and benefits
of proposed regulation and to submit results of this analysis to the Office of Management
and Budget); http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/return_letter.html (linking to
43
44
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unique harms.52 Nonetheless, such resources, according to Lazarus, “not
only exist but are worth protecting” because “there are certain results—such
as species extinction or resource destruction—that humankind should strive
to avoid because they fall beyond its legitimate authority.”53
Part III of the Article will return to Lazarus’s description of
ecological injury. There, the Article will consider whether these features of
ecological injury are in fact unique to environmental law and whether they
justify applying special rules to environmental law cases (or otherwise
uniquely treating those cases).
2.

Modify General Rules in Environmental Cases

Second, courts might apply the same general principles in all cases,
regardless of topic or context, but alter them slightly in environmental cases.
In other words, courts could employ the same legal formulations in
environmental cases as they do in all other areas of law, but apply them
somewhat differently. For example, courts and scholars have long talked
about whether, under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard for judicial
review of agency action, courts ought to take a “hard look” at what agencies
do—requiring agencies to provide detailed and persuasive explanations for
their actions, to consider all material objections raised by interested parties,
to back up their decisions with hard data, etc.—or whether they ought to use
a more deferential approach when reviewing agency action.54 Under the
paradigm suggested here, courts could continue to use the congressionallymandated arbitrary and capricious review standard to review all agency
actions, regardless of whether those actions involve the environment or some
other area (e.g., labor, securities, banking), but employ a harder look
approach to environmental decisions than decisions in other fields.55
Similarly, although courts applying the “rational basis” standard of review in
“return letters” in which OMB informs a federal agency that its regulation is, among other
things, “not consistent with the regulatory principles stated in Executive Order 12866”).
52 Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 748.
53 Id. at 748.
54 For a detailed history of the “hard look” doctrine, see Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and
Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 525-61 (1985).
55 Such a suggestion was made by prominent D.C. Circuit Judge Bazelon in the 1970s. See,
e.g., Natural Resources Defense Counsel, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n,
547 F.2d 633, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Bazelon, J., concurring) (arguing that agency decisions
“touching the environment” require “more precision . . . than the less rigorous development
of scientific facts which may attend notice and comment procedures”); Environmental
Defense Fund v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.3d 584, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (arguing for application
of harder look in cases where “administrative action . . . touches on fundamental personal
interests in life, health, and liberty”). Lazarus also appears to endorse this type of analysis.
See Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, supra n. 11, at 206 (praising Judge Skelly Wright for
appreciating “what makes environmental law, like civil rights law, particularly in need of
heightened judicial scrutiny to safeguard the interests of those less politically powerful
(whether racial minorities or unborn future generations”). For a critique of this position, see
Stephen Breyer, Vermont Yankee and the Courts’ Role in the Nuclear Energy Controversy, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1833 (1978).
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constitutional law require only that the court be able to rationalize some
post-hoc justification for challenged government action,56 a court following
this paradigm for decision-making might insist that the legislature have
actually articulated its reasoning at the time of enactment even while still
testing that reason for mere rationality. Finally, courts applying the two part
test for ripeness57 might continue to articulate that test in terms of fitness and
hardship, but lower the legal threshold for finding one or both of these
requirements in environmental cases.
3.

Consider the Environment When Forming General Rules

The third potential paradigm for environmental decision-making
centers on the formulation of general rules, rather than their application.
Specifically, courts could consider the distinctive features of ecological injury
as one set of factors among many when crafting general rules to apply in all
contexts. Certainly, in some situations at least, courts form rules to some
degree based on how they expect those rules will promote certain real world
interests, and they evaluate, refine, and in some cases modify (or discard)
those rules based on whether the rules in fact turn out to serve those real
world interests.58 To the extent that environmental cases raise somewhat
different issues than other types of cases, based on the remarkable features of
ecological injury, courts might consider how any proposed or already
articulated general rule might affect environmental interests when crafting or
modifying the rule, even though the rule will apply not only in environmental
cases but in all other contexts as well.
When considering environmental issues as part of crafting general
rules, courts might try to proceed all at once, or they could proceed
incrementally. By proceeding all at once, courts could attempt to frame a
broad and general rule to cover all (or most) relevant situations in a single
case, and they could attempt to imagine the environmental ramifications of
that rule even if the specific case they were considering did not arise in the
environmental field (or even if the specific case was environmental but did
not present the court with an opportunity to reflect upon all the unique
aspects of ecological injury). For example, if the Court in Abbott Laboratories
had been proceeding under this judicial paradigm, it would have had to at
least try to consider the unique effects that its two part rule for ripeness
might have in environmental contexts, even though the specific controversy
it was deciding involved food and drug law.

See Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 75 (2002) (“Under rational basis review, by
contrast, it is ‘constitutionally irrelevant [what] reasoning in fact underlay the legislative
decision.’”) (citations and internal quotations omitted).
57 See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
58 See text accompanying notes 139-141, infra, for discussion of theories of statutory and
constitutional interpretation that consider real world effects.
56
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Alternatively, courts might develop their rules incrementally.
Although courts sometimes announce general rules quite suddenly, in the
course of deciding a single case, these rules are not always set in stone, and
they do not necessarily, by their terms, cover all situations. Rather, rules
often evolve over time, as courts refine the details of the rule’s application,
consider how the rule should apply in new contexts, reflect upon critiques of
the rule raised in briefs, scholarly articles, and other commentary by experts
and political actors, evaluate the real-world effects of the rule they have
crafted, and even consider whether the rule ought to be discarded.59 An
example in the classic Chevron rule,60 which was announced quite suddenly in
the Court’s 1984 decision61 but which has been refined in a series of
subsequent decisions,62 including the recent Christensen63 and Mead64 decisions
which have limited the scope of the doctrine to certain types of agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes. The Supreme Court’s application of
different levels of scrutiny in the areas of affirmative action65 and commercial
speech66 provide two other examples from the constitutional law context.67
Courts that want to ensure that general rules are informed by
environmental concerns can develop general rules incrementally by
considering the unique features of ecological injury as they figure out how to
apply the general rule in a series of environmental cases. As they do this,
59 For a description and consideration of so-called “judicial incrementalism,” see generally,
Keith J. Bybee, The Jurisprudence of Uncertainty, 35 LAW AND SOC’Y R. 943 (2001).
60 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 476 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding
that courts should defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes).
61 See id.
62 See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987) (looking to “traditional tools of
statutory construction” including legislative history to determine whether statute is
ambiguous under step one of Chevron); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529
U.S. 120 (2000) (suggesting there might be some “extraordinary cases” in which agency
interpretations are not entitled to deference). See also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin H.
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 838-39 (2001) (describing development of
Chevron rule).
63 Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that a Labor Department
“Opinion Letter” was not entitled to deference).
64 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (holding that informal Customs Service
“ruling letter” was not entitled to deference).
65 Compare Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 564-65 (1990) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to affirmative action programs) with Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pena, 515 U.S.200, 235 (1995) (overruling Metro Broadcasting and applying strict scrutiny to
affirmative action programs).
66 Compare Valentine v. Christensen, 316 U.S. 52, 55 (1942) (applying no heightened review
to prohibition on the distribution of advertising material in or upon any street) with Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-70
(determining that commercial speech does deserve some protection) with Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563-64 (1980) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech restrictions) with 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 500-501 (1996) (several Justices applying stricter than intermediate level
of review to regulations of truthful commercial speech).
67 For consideration of incremental evolution of constitutional law rules, see Jay D. Wexler,
Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
298, 319-20, 342-48 (1998).
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they may decide to proceed in one of several directions. Specifically, courts
could find that (1) the general rule fits well in various environmental
contexts, and needs no modification; (2) certain aspects of the rule do not fit
well in some environmental contexts, and therefore the general rule ought to
be modified somewhat; (3) although certain aspects of the rule do not fit well
in some environmental contexts, the interests served by the general rule,
which would be undermined by modification, are weightier than the
problems caused by the rule’s application in the environmental context, and
so the rule should remain unmodified; or (4) some combination of #2 and
#3, in which some aspects of the rule are modified, and others remain the
same.68
Thus, to return to the ripeness example, the Court might have
announced the fitness and hardship test in the Abbott Laboratories case but
then reconsidered this standard, in all of its aspects, as it applied the test in
various environmental cases. Perhaps the Court would have found that the
test should remain entirely the same, or perhaps it would have found that
some part of the test should be removed or altered, on the grounds that
keeping the test in its initial form would too substantially undermine
environmental interests. For instance, the Court could have found that
restricting pre-enforcement review in most cases to purely legal challenges to
regulations69 would be too limiting to provide adequate protection to the
environment. In this case, it would have to further balance the benefits of
this aspect of the rule (reducing administrative burdens on the courts,
improving judicial decision-making, etc.) against the environmental benefits
of changing the rule to allow factual as well as purely legal challenges to notyet-enforced regulations.
It is worth using this ripeness example to note the difference between
this judicial paradigm and the first two paradigms discussed above. In those
other paradigms, if a court were to find that the “purely legal challenge”
requirement was unsuitable for environmental cases, it would either change
that portion of the ripeness test for environmental cases while keeping the
rule unchanged for other types of cases (paradigm #1), or broaden the
notion of “purely legal” in environmental cases (but not other cases) to allow
factual based challenges to proceed (paradigm #2). Under this paradigm,
however, if a court were to find that some aspect of a rule is under-protective
of environmental interests and does not serve a sufficiently compelling
general interest that outweighs the harm to environmental interests, it would
change the rule for all cases, not just environmental ones.
4.

Consider Distinctive Features of Ecological Injury When
Applying Facts to Law

68 Any decision to take the law in a radical new direction, of course, should be made only
after consideration of stare decisis principles. See text accompanying notes 118-122, infra.
69 See Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967) (finding the case fit for
review because the challenge was “a purely legal one”).

15

The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law

This paradigm is slightly more straightforward than the previous
three, in that it involves no alteration of legal rules or changes in the process
of rule creation. Instead, it would simply call for courts to consider
accurately and faithfully the features of ecological injury when applying a
previously developed general rule of law to some set of facts. This paradigm
would require courts to recognize all of the various features that Lazarus
describes (and any other relevant remarkable features), including the
substantial nature of ecological injury, the difficult causal relationships
involved in creating these injuries, and the temporal and geographical
uniqueness of the injuries as well.70 Moreover, courts would have to consider
these features both when the relevant legal test calls for some evaluation or
weighing of the potential ecological injury involved, as well as when the legal
test involves reviewing an agency’s (or some other actor’s) reasoning or
explanation regarding the nature of the ecological injury. The premise
behind identifying this as a distinct paradigm is that courts have in fact failed
to recognize the unique features of ecological injury and have thus not
considered those features appropriately when applying facts to law.71
Although the Article will have much more to say regarding this
paradigm in Part III, it is worth noting at this point the difference between
this paradigm for judicial decision-making and the paradigm described as #2
above—namely, that courts ought to apply general rules in a special fashion
in environmental law cases.72 The two paradigms might result in similarly
distinct types of results in environmental cases, but for different reasons. In
the paradigm discussed here, any differences in result would stem from the
real differences between the ecological injury at issue in the case and other
types of injuries, while in the paradigm discussed above the differences
would result from a change in the applicable legal standard, which would be
different for all cases involving environmental issues. For example, a
plaintiff might more easily be able to demonstrate ripeness in a preenforcement challenge to an environmental regulation than to, say, an aircraft
safety regulation, under both paradigms, but for different reasons. Under
this second paradigm, the plaintiff would have an easier time winning its case
because the legal threshold for finding hardship (for example) would be
lower in all environmental cases, while under the fourth paradigm, the
plaintiff’s case might be easier because the court, applying the same hardship
standard that it would apply in any case, would be more willing to believe
that the alleged environmental harm would be irrevocable and catastrophic,
and thus more willing to find that denying pre-enforcement review would
cause hardship.
5.

Employ Environmental Rhetoric or Provide Environmental
Advice.

See text accompanying notes 43-53, supra.
See, e.g., Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 706-07.
72 See text accompanying notes 53-57, infra.
70
71
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The fifth paradigm focuses not on development or application of
legal rules or even on application of facts to law, but on the language
employed by judges in justifying, explaining, or otherwise articulating their
opinions. Judges might, in addition to dispassionately laying out the grounds
for their decision, also include in their opinion writing an expression of their
personal views on the environmental aspect of their decision either through
the rhetoric they employ73 or by providing explicit advice74 to some political
actor or actors. This paradigm would approve of such expressions, at least in
some form.
The strongest form of the paradigm might encourage judges to
always express their personal views on the environment in all decisions,
regardless of circumstances or form that these views might take. But short
of this very strong position, numerous possible variations exist, each of
which would approve of rhetoric or advice of some types but not others, or
in some situations but not others. Judges might divide acceptable from nonacceptable language among several potential dimensions, including content,
tone, type of opinion, or amount. For example, one variation might hold
that pro-environmental rhetoric or advice is acceptable, while antienvironmental rhetoric or advice is not. Another might hold exactly the
opposite. A third would approve of respectful, measured rhetoric and
disapprove of strident or demeaning rhetorical flourishes. A fourth might
endorse rhetoric in dissenting or separate opinions but not in majority
By “rhetoric” I refer to the specific words chosen by the author of the opinion to express
her result, as opposed to the result itself, including what she chooses to emphasize, what
messages she attempts to communicate through her choice of words, what tone or attitude is
implied by those choices, and the like. For example, when Lazarus refers to Justice Douglas’
“genuine passion” in one of his dissents (and quotes from that dissent) or to Justice Black’s
“emotional dissent” in another case (also quoted from), he is referring to the specific
rhetoric chosen by the authors as opposed merely to the result each would have reached. See
Id., at 738-39. For one discussion of judicial rhetoric in the secondary literature, see Patricia
M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV.
1371 (1995) (one of several articles in a symposium on opinion writing).
74 By “advice” I refer to specific suggestions that a court might make in its opinion as to how
some actor or actors should proceed. By its nature, advice does not constitute any sort of
binding requirement. For example, a court might suggest that Congress enact a certain type
of environmental law or suggest that the EPA enforce an existing law differently. Advice
can also come in the form of criticism or chiding; if a court criticizes Congress for not
enacting a particular law, it is essentially advising the legislature to enact that law. For a
comprehensive treatment of judicial advice-giving by the Supreme Court in constitutional
cases, see Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998) (defending
advice-giving). Katyal defines “advicegiving” as occurring when “occurs when judges
recommend, but do not mandate, a particular course of action based on a rule or principle in
a judicial case or controversy.” Id. at 1710. My definition would exclude the portion of
Katyal’s definition which limits advice giving to recommendations based on rules or
principles. While I agree that principle-based advice giving is the most defensible type of
advice giving, I see no reason to limit the concept of advice giving to only these types of
recommendations. If a judge provides pure policy suggestions unconnected to any type of
principle enunciated in his decision, that still, in my view, constitutes advice giving, though
perhaps not a defensible sort.
73
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opinions. A fifth might hold that short statements of personal opinion are
suitable, but would disapprove of longer forays. A sixth might endorse the
use of rhetoric but not explicit advice. Obviously, a plethora of other
possible positions and combinations involving these dimensions are easy to
imagine.
Perhaps the most interesting way that judges might distinguish
acceptable language from unacceptable language is on the basis of the
language’s purpose. Judges might want to employ environmentally-centered
rhetoric or advice for a variety of different reasons. For example, they may
want to affect the policy choices of Congress or other political actors; to call
voters’ attention to policy-making deficiencies; to point out the unintended
effects of statutes, regulations, or other sources of law; to praise political
actors for their decisions; to encourage citizens to engage in certain kinds of
non-political activities; to affect future court decisions (particularly if the
writer is in the dissent); or simply to vent anger or frustration. Variations
might approve of one or some of these purposes but not others. For
example, one possible variation would approve of using language for the
purpose of affecting the activities or choices of citizens but not of Congress;
another might approve of any type of language intended to serve a nonpersonal (venting) purpose. Of course, purpose-based limits on the use of
language might be combined with other limits (tone, type of opinion,
content), to create additional permutations, such as, for example, a variation
that would approve only of short statements in dissenting opinions for the
purpose of affecting future court decisions.75
6.

Reach Decisions Based on Preferred Outcome.

Sixth, courts or individual judges might adopt the view that they
should reach decisions in environmental law cases based on their preferred
policy outcomes, regardless of the specific factual and legal context in which
75 Professor Lazarus would have courts adopt some version of this paradigm.
In his
writings, Lazarus strongly urges the Court to adopt an “environmental voice.” Lazarus,
Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 715. In addition to calling for the Justices to
articulate an “overarching view of the environmental law field,” id., he would also welcome
seeing some pro-environment rhetoric emerge from the Justices’ opinions. This point
comes through when Lazarus critiques three fairly recent Court decisions which, though
reaching admirable pro-environment results, nonetheless contain no positive statements
regarding the uniqueness of environmental injury or the importance of environmental
protection. Id. at 737-38 (criticizing Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978);
City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund, 511 U.S. 328 (1994); and Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687 (1995)). In criticizing
these decisions, Lazarus notes how different the opinions would read if they had been
written by Justice Douglas, the “only environmental justice ever on the Court, at least in
modern times,” id. at 724, who possessed “genuine passion” for the environment. Id. at 738.
Citing Justice Black’s “emotional dissent” in another environmental law case, id. at 739,
Lazarus urges the Justices to express “emotion” in their opinions, because it “sends an
influential message” to other courts and the public. Id. “Rigorous, sound legal reasoning,”
Lazarus concludes, “need not be devoid of passion or the power of moral suasion to be
legitimate or to be effective.” Id.
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the case arises. Thus, a judge who believes that the world would be a better
place if the environment received maximum protection might decide to reach
decisions favorable to environmental interests regardless of whether the best
view of the legal materials points in that direction. Conversely, a judge who
finds environmental regulation of corporate actors objectionable, for
example, might decide to always rule in favor of those corporate actors
regardless of circumstances.
This paradigm too has important potential variations. One set of
variations would turn on the amount and type of reasoning that a judge
would use in support of her outcome-based (or influenced) opinion. For
example, one judge might believe that the outcome-based nature of her
decision ought to be made explicit, while another might decide to rationalize
an outcome-driven decision with reasoning that he or she does not
necessarily believe and did not in fact rely upon. Still another judge might
prefer to simply announce the result without providing much reasoning at all.
A second (and more significant) set of variations would relate to the
preconditions that a judge might insist upon before voting in an outcomefocused manner. For instance, a judge might decide that instead of reaching
pro-environmental results in all cases, he or she will require that a certain
amount of indeterminacy be present before voting in favor of protecting the
environment, doing so only do so if such a result is “at all plausible,”
“reasonable,” “non-laughable,” or some other self-defined standard. As Part
III.F of the Article discusses in some detail, this last possibility—that judges
should decide cases specifically to protect the environment whenever the
case involves some significant amount of indeterminacy—is a potentially
important normative position.76
7.

Do Not Consider the Environmental Aspects of the Case.

Finally, judges and courts might completely ignore (at least at a
conscious level) the fact that the case happens to involve environmental
issues. Such a judge would commit himself to deciding cases in an
“environment-blind” manner. This means, at least, that the judge would not
adopt special rules for environmental cases, apply general rules in any special
manner in environmental cases, use any unique language relating to the
environmental aspect of the case, or consider environmental facts to be any
different than any other type of facts. Whether or not this paradigm makes
actual coherent sense is an issue that will be discussed below, but one can
easily imagine a judge thinking that she is in fact approaching a case without
paying any attention to the environmental aspects of the case and assuming
that those aspects pose no special, unique, or distinct issues or concerns.
8.

76

An Example: Chemical Manufacturer’s Association

See text accompanying notes 190-218, infra.
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In this subpart, the Article uses the Supreme Court case of Chemical
Manufacturer’s Association v. National Resources Defense Council,77 to illustrate the
seven paradigms articulated in the previous Part. The discussion is meant to
be illustrative rather than exhaustive. It is intended to show what it might
mean for a court in each case to proceed under each of the seven paradigms,
but it is possible that a court, proceeding under one of the paradigms, would
do something different than precisely what is described here. The discussion
in this Part is meant to be descriptive rather than normative. At the end of
the next Part, the Article will briefly take up the normative questions of how
the Court should have proceeded in the case and whether the Court in fact
proceeded appropriately. Finally, the Article will briefly describe one
important scholarly critique of the Court’s decision and consider whether
that critique is persuasive.
Pursuant to sections 301 and 304 of the Clean Water Act, the EPA is
charged with identifying classes and categories of industrial sources and
setting effluent limitations for different pollutants, including those known as
“toxic pollutants,” for each industrial class and category.78 Plants are
prohibited by the Act from discharging pollutants into the navigable waters
without a permit,79 and the agency is required by statute to write the effluent
limitations applicable to the relevant class or category into the plant’s
discharge permit.80 At the time of the Chemical Manufacturers Association case,
section 301 of the Act included two sections authorizing EPA to modify the
general effluent limitations applicable to a plant’s class or category: section
301(c) modifications for plants finding it economically impossible to meet
the limitations,81 and 301(g) exemptions for cases in which the limitations
would not be necessary to ensure water quality.82 At the same time, section
470 U.S. 116 (1985).
33 U.S.C. § 1311(b); 1314(a). The Act defines “toxic pollutants” broadly to include
pollutants “which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion, inhalation or assimilation
into any organism . . . will . . . cause death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic
mutations, physiological malfunctions . . . or physical deformations.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13).
79 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
80 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a).
81 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1984) (“The Administrator may modify the requirements of [§
301’s effluent limitations] with respect to any point source for which a permit application is
filed after July 1, 1977, upon a showing by the owner or operator of such point source
satisfactory to the Administrator that such modified requirements (1) will represent the
maximum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and
(2) will result in reasonable further progress toward the elimination of the discharge of
pollutants.”).
82 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (1984) (“The Administrator, with the concurrence of the State,
shall modify the requirements of [§ 301’s effluent limitations] with respect to the discharge
of any pollutant (other than pollutants identified pursuant to section 1314(a)(4) of this title,
toxic pollutants subject to section 1317(a) of this title, and the thermal component of
discharges) from any point source upon a showing by the owner or operator of such a point
source satisfactory to the Administrator that . . . (C) such modification will not interfere with
the attainment or maintenance of that water quality which shall assure protection of public
water supplies, and the protection and propagation of a balanced population of shellfish,
fish, and wildlife, and allow recreational activities, in and on the water and such modification
77
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301(l) of the Act provided that: “The Administrator may not modify any
requirement of this section as it applies to any [toxic pollutant].”83
Before this latter section was added in 1977, the agency had adopted
by regulation the practice of occasionally granting a third type of exemption,
a so-called “fundamentally different factor” or “FDF” variance, which
allowed a plant to show that it was misclassified and that therefore it should
be governed by a more lenient effluent limitation.84 To get such a variance,
the plant had to show that some fundamentally different factor, such as the
quality of pollutants in its wastewater or the volume of that wastewater,
distinguished it from the other plants with which it was classified.85 When
the agency continued to grant FDF variances after the addition of section
301(l) in 1977,86 environmental groups sued, claiming that for toxic
pollutants, 301(l) prohibited the agency from granting not only 301(c) and
301(g) modifications, but FDF variances as well.87
Five justices for the court held, in an opinion written by Justice
White, that the EPA could continue to grant the FDF variances.88 The court
applied the recently articulated Chevron rule89 and deferred to the agency on
the grounds that the text and legislative history of the statute was ambiguous
on the question of whether 301(l) prohibited FDF variances90 and that the
agency’s interpretation of 301(l) was reasonable.91 On this latter part of the
test, the Court accepted and even endorsed EPA’s rationale, which was that
the FDF variance constituted a very different kind of exception than the
other two exceptions. Whereas 301(c) and 301(g) allowed the agency to
change a limitation applying to a properly classified plant, the FDF process
authorized the agency to fix a misclassification resulting from its inevitable
inability, given the strict and difficult timetables established by the Act, to
consider all relevant factors when developing its classificatory scheme. As
the Court put it:

will not result in the discharge of pollutants in quantities which may reasonably be
anticipated to pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment.”).
83 33 U.S.C. § 1311(l) (1984).
84 See Chemical Manufacturer’s, 470 U.S. at 120-123 & n.7 (describing the FDF variance and
quoting the regulation in which it was contained).
85 40 CFR § 403.13(d) (1984).
86 As the Supreme Court noted, the EPA had granted very few (only four) FDF variances at
the time of the suit. Chemical Manufacturer’s, 470 U.S. at 124 n.12.
87 Plaintiffs also challenged EPA’s statutory authority to issue FDF variances, even when
toxic pollutants were not at issue, but the lower court did not consider the argument, and
therefore the Supreme Court did not address it either, instead “assum[ing], without deciding,
that EPA would have authority under the Act to issue the FDF variances . . . absent the
provisions of § 301(l).” Chemical Manufacturer’s, 470 U.S. at 124 n.13.
88 Id. at 125.
89 See id. at 125 (identifying Chevron as relevant rule of law).
90 See id. at 125-29.
91 See id. at 130-33.
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Understandably, EPA may not be apprised of and will fail to
consider unique factors applicable to atypical plants during
the categorical rulemaking process, and it is thus important
that EPA’s nationally binding categorical treatment standards
. . . be tempered with the flexibility that the FDF variance
mechanism offers, a mechanism repugnant to neither the
goals nor the operation of the Act.92
The dissent, while agreeing that Chevron was the proper rule of law to
govern the case,93 nonetheless would have held that the statute clearly
precluded all modifications to effluent limitations applicable to toxic
pollutants and that the FDF variance was such a modification.94 In the
course of its discussion, the dissent placed special emphasis on the
environmental costs of granting exceptions to generally applicable
environmental regulations,95 costs which it believed explained Congress’s
decision to preclude all such exceptions for toxic pollutants.96
Turning to the first two of the seven paradigms, since Chevron is
clearly the rule of law that applies in the case, courts following these
paradigms would have either replaced (#1) or modified (#2) Chevron in
environmental cases, including this case.97 A court following the first
paradigm, therefore, would have applied some different rule of law for
evaluating agency interpretations of environmental statutes; perhaps it would
have adopted a rule that courts should not defer to such interpretations, or
that they should only afford environmental agencies a lesser kind of
deference, such as the “respect” for agency interpretations afforded by the
so-called Skidmore doctrine.98 Either way, if the Court in Chemical
Manufacturer’s had followed this paradigm, it probably would have afforded
somewhat less deference to the EPA’s interpretation of section 301(l),
although it is unclear whether the different legal standard would have led the
Court to reach a different result.

Id. at 132-33
See id. at 152 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“My disagreement with the Court does not center
on its reading of Chevron, but instead on its analysis of the congressional purposes behind §
301(l).”).
94 See id. at 151 (“The determination that Congress clearly intended that § 301(l) do more
than just ban modifications otherwise permitted by §§ 301(c) and (g) compels the conclusion
that EPA’s construction to the contrary cannot stand.”).
95 See id. at 159-60 & n. 19.
96 See id. at 160 (“In this case, Congress determined that the flexibility resulting from
exceptions would interfere with the furtherance of the more important goal of controlling
toxic pollution.”)
97 Clearly this would be a strange thing for the Court to do, given that Chevron was itself an
environmental case. Nonetheless, the possibility existed, at least as a theoretical matter.
98 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) (“We consider that the rulings,
interpretations and opinions of the Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon
the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance.”).
92
93
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Following the second paradigm, a court would have kept the Chevron
doctrine for environmental cases, at least in name, but would have applied it
somewhat differently in those cases. This different application might have
entailed using a higher standard for reasonableness on the second step of the
test, limiting the types of interpretations afforded deference in environmental
cases,99 or employing a different approach to determining ambiguity, such as
focusing on all possible indicia of congressional intent rather than solely
examining the text itself.100 Again, given the substantial deference afforded
under the Chevron doctrine as applied by the majority, any potential
modification of the doctrine under this paradigm would probably have
moved the Court toward giving somewhat less deference to the EPA’s
interpretation of section 301(l).
A court acting under the third paradigm would have considered
whether the case presented any question regarding the proper application of
Chevron to administrative action which had not yet been answered by
previous cases (or which had not been answered satisfactorily), and then
would have considered how the nature of ecological injury should affect the
question’s resolution, recognizing that this resolution would be applicable to
all types of cases, not simply environmental ones.101 Chemical Manufacturers
Association was decided less than a year after the Court decided Chevron, so not
only were the stare decisis interests not very high at the time of decision, but
also the Court had not yet had the opportunity to apply the Chevron rule in a
broad range of cases posing a variety of different circumstances and potential
sub-issues or peripheral issues within Chevron’s sphere of application.
One possible such question posed by application of the third
paradigm to Chemical Manufacturer’s Association is whether an agency ought to
get the same kind of deference for its interpretation of exceptions to
statutory requirements as it gets for its interpretations of the requirements
themselves. On the one hand, given the traditional rationales for the Chevron
doctrine—agency expertise and accountability,102 and an assumption that
Congress intends to delegate primary interpretive authority to agencies rather
than courts103—there may be no reason to distinguish between the two types
of cases. On the other hand, as Justice Marshall’s dissent suggests, perhaps a
different rule for exceptions is called for due to the potentially high costs of
For example, maybe the Court would have decided to give deference only to regulations
promulgated following notice and comment procedures, as it did nearly twenty years later, see
United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
100 For a debate on this issue, compare the majority and concurring opinions in INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
101 Of course, whether the Court would have considered creating some sort of modification
or exception to the general Chevron rule might understandably turned on whether any party in
the litigation raised the possibility of creating such a modification or exception.
102 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.”).
103 See Merrill & Hickman, supra n. 62, at 870-73 (defending congressional intent theory as
the best basis for Chevron rule).
99
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exceptions, particularly in the environmental context.104 Although Marshall
did not purport to apply any broad based “exceptions exception” to Chevron
in all (not just environmental) cases, a court proceeding under this paradigm
might have decided that because of the costs of exceptions in the
environmental area, it should create a Chevron sub-rule, precluding deference
to agencies when they purport to create exceptions to regulatory
requirements, in all cases and contexts. In doing so, the court would
presumably want to balance the benefits of such an exception against the
potential costs, such as any net decrease in expertise and accountability that
would result from removing interpretational authority in this one area from
agencies to courts.
Using the fourth paradigm, a court would have paid special attention
to the remarkable features of ecological injury when thinking through the
issues and reaching its result. Perhaps the key fact would be the magnitude
of injury to water quality and to the health of humans or other species that
could result from the granting of an FDF variance to a polluting plant. A
court placing significant emphasis on these remarkable features of ecological
injury would presumably assume that those features are indeed relevant to
the resolution of the case under the applicable legal standard, e.g., Chevron.
One line of reasoning might be that the potentially catastrophic nature of
ecological injury is relevant to deciding whether Congress clearly precluded
the FDF variance through its enactment of 301(l); a second would be that it
is relevant to whether the agency’s interpretation of the statutory provision is
reasonable. The first line of reasoning is reflected in Justice Marshall’s
dissent, where he argued that the possibility of disastrous consequences
resulting from an FDF variance should have led the court to presume that
Congress precluded the agency from granting any sort of exceptions or
variances for toxic substances, particularly in light of Congress’s explicit
provision prohibiting any modifications.105
The fifth paradigm involves the use of judicial language to emphasize
the environmental aspects of the case, either through rhetoric or advice.
Since this could include potentially limitless types of linguistic emphases,
descriptions, statements, and discussions—anything from images of water
pollution to praise of the FDF variance procedure to discussions of the
impact of water pollution on species and human health to a suggestion that
EPA rescind the FDF variance regulation—there is little to be gained here
from cataloging all the possibilities. It is worth noting, however, that this is a
case in which the court, or some portion of the court, could plausibly have
highlighted either for Congress or the voting public the costs that Congress’s

Cf. Chemical Manufacturer’s, 470 U.S. at 159-60 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting the costs of
exceptions to environmental regulations).
105 See id., 470 U.S. at 160 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
104
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lack of clarity in its framing of section 301(l) had brought about in terms of
uncertainty and litigation spanning the course of years.106
Following a strong version of the sixth paradigm, a court would have
simply reached the result it wanted to reach regardless of what it thought of
the specific legal question presented and the relevant facts. Alternatively, if
the court had followed one of the weaker variations described above,107 it
would have reached the desired result only if doing so would not have
violated whatever standard it had set to limit its outcome focused approach.
So, in other words, it is possible to imagine a particular judge believing that
she should reach a pro-environment result in the case (i.e., finding that the
FDF variance was prohibited by the statute) only if the statute and the
legislative history were highly indeterminate, and then concluding that
because those materials were in fact highly indeterminate, she would indeed
decide the case against the government. And of course, she could have
provided more or less reasoning in support of her result depending on the
specific contours of the paradigm she had chosen.108
Finally, pursuant to the seventh paradigm, a court would have simply
approached the case without paying any special attention to the
environmental aspects of the case. It would certainly not have altered any
generally applicable rules for use in environmental cases or modified such
rules in response to lessons learned in applying the case to environmental
facts. It would also not have treated the nature of the ecological injury
caused by potential water pollution as being special in any way, and it would
not have employed environmentally-related rhetoric or advice in any manner
for any purpose.
III.

Evaluating the Paradigms

In this Part, the Article evaluates the seven paradigms described in
Part II. Specifically, the Article explains which of the seven paradigms courts
should adopt in full, which they should adopt in part, and which they should
reject. In doing so, it seeks to provide courts and scholars with some
concrete guidance respecting when courts ought to treat environmental law
cases in a unique fashion and when they should, as Georgetown’s Richard
Lazarus puts it, “stri[p] the ‘environment’ out of environmental law.”109
Eight years passed between the congressional amendment creating section 301(l) and the
Supreme Court case that resolved its meaning.
107 See text accompanying notes 75-76, supra.
108 See text accompanying notes 75-76, supra.
109 Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra n. 11, at 635. Lazarus says that the Justices should focus “in
the first instance,” id., on crosscutting issues and presume that “[t]here is one consistent
answer applicable to all contexts within which these crosscutting issues arise.” Lazarus,
Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 740. But he also argues that the Court should
rethink entire areas of law “when the environmental dimension of a case illuminates a
general doctrinal failing,” id. at 741, and he suggests that when “pre-existing doctrinal
solutio[ns]” “reflec[t] a balancing of competing values,” the Court might apply that doctrine
106
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After considering each of the paradigms in turn, the Article returns to the
Chemical Manufacturer’s case and argues that, for the most part, the Court
rightly stripped the environment out of that particular environmental law
case.
1.

Special Rules.

The following paragraphs present eight reasons why courts should
not adopt the first paradigm identified above, arguing that courts should not
apply special legal rules in environmental law cases. The eight reasons
proceed roughly in increasing order of importance. While one or even a few
of the reasons might not be sufficient by themselves to defeat the case for
the first paradigm, the eight reasons together are adequate, and indeed the
final reason is most likely a sufficient reason itself for courts not to apply
special environmental law rules.
First, adopting special rules for environmental law cases would
undermine the simplicity, coherence, and consistency of the law. Applying
one rule for environmental law cases but another rule for all other areas of
law would undermine the law’s uniformity and regularity. Such a regime
would make it more difficult for courts to apply legal rules, and more difficult
for attorneys, government officials, and regulated parties to understand the
law and to conform their behavior to its mandates. The paradigm would
increase the administrative costs of the legal system simply by increasing its
complexity.110
A second, more specific, administrative cost raised by the first
paradigm is definitional. Courts applying special rules in environmental law
cases would first have to determine whether any particular case is in fact
environmental, which raises the question: What counts as environmental?
Surely, environmental law’s focus on the natural environment makes it clear
that some cases are correctly categorized as environmental. Cases involving
in a more “careful” and “different” manner “in the environmental context.” Id. at 740.
Beyond these very vague directions, however, Lazarus does not explain in any more detail
how courts should decide whether the environmental aspect of the case should lead them to
reach a different result than if they were deciding, say, a labor law or food and drug case.
Significantly, all of Lazarus’s examples involve cases or areas of law in which he criticizes the
Court for failing to consider the unique features of ecological injury; he provides no
examples praising the Court for applying general principles of law without considering those
unique features. This failure to provide any examples of cases in which courts rightly
“stripp[ed the] environment out of environmental law,” Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra n. 11, at
635, will make it very difficult for courts to figure out when such stripping would be
appropriate. This Article, by contrast, attempts to give a more concrete and balanced view
of when courts should engage in such “stripping.”
110 Creation of special rules in particular areas of law would by no means be a new
development, however. Courts have created and applied many such rules, even in
environmental law areas. See n. 129, infra. But the fact that the law is not as simple,
coherent, and consistent as it might be is no argument in favor of making the law more
complicated, incoherent, and inconsistent.
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challenges to regulations setting standards for air quality or arguments over
the interpretation of the Endangered Species Act are clearly environmental in
nature. But beyond the obvious cases, more difficult questions arise. For
example, which, if any, of the following legal or factual topics are properly
classified as environmental? National Park Service concession contracts?
Freedom of Information requests from environmental agencies? Disputes
over mining rights, water allocation, or interstate land boundaries? Are all
transportation and energy issues also environmental, given the close
connection between the various policy areas? Is the same true for
architectural issues? Although courts could certainly sort these issues out,
the task would be difficult and time-consuming. It would also cause a great
deal of uncertainty for interested parties and consume a great deal of
resources, as industry, government, and activists argue at length in court
about which cases at the margins count as environmental law cases.
Third, intimately related to the second concern, is the problem of
overbreadth. If the justification for applying special rules in environmental
cases turns on the unique nature of ecological injury, then it would seem
inevitable that any rough definition of “environmental” will include cases
which do not implicate particularly catastrophic or irreversible harms.111 This
is true not only for marginally environmental issues like the legality of the
National Park Service concession regulations112 or allocation of boundary
rights between states,113 but also for those issues that are clearly
environmental but which for some reason—perhaps they are small in scope
or do not involve difficult causation patterns—do not raise the specter of
particularly difficult or problematic harms. There is a big difference, after all,
between large scale, programmatic environmental law controversies such as
the Bush Administration’s failure to regulate carbon dioxide emissions114 or
the looming question of whether the Endangered Species Act passes
constitutional muster under the Commerce Clause,115 and smaller scale cases
involving agency adjudications of specific and limited activities, such as the
validity of a Clean Water Act permit, the failure to perform an
Environmental Impact Statement for a single project, or an application to fill
one acre of wetlands. The latter issues are important, of course, and the
111 See text accompanying notes 43-53, supra (describing Lazarus’s characterizations of
environmental injury). It is certainly true, as Lazarus says, that sometimes small changes in
the environment can bring about large consequences, due to the fact that ecological harm
has an “inherently threshold character.” LAZARUS, supra n. 11, at 11-12. But this does not
mean that every action poses the same amount of risk to the environment.
112 See, e.g., National Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803 (2003)
(rejecting as unripe a challenge to an aspect of the National Park Service’s concession
regulations).
113 See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767 (1998) (determining border dispute
between New York and New Jersey in favor of New Jersey).
114 See, e.g., Guy Gugliotta & Eric Pianin, Bush Plans on Global Warming Alter Little, WASH.
POST, Jan. 1, 2004, at A1 (describing Bush’s refusal to issue mandatory limits on carbon
dioxide emissions).
115 See, e.g., Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) (upholding application of ESA
against commerce clause attack).
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interconnectedness of natural systems and the “inherently threshold
character” of ecological harms116 makes them perhaps more important than
one might otherwise first think, but they are also clearly different in kind
from the large scale issues that far more clearly implicate the types of harms
that Lazarus identifies. It is not clear that the harms caused by the small
scale issues are sufficiently unique to justify the different application of
special rules, even if it is granted that the uniqueness of some environmental
harms is sufficient to justify the application of such rules, but any paradigm
that would differentiate between “environmental law” issues and other types
of issues would inevitably sweep those smaller scale harms into its reach.117
Fourth, stare decisis concerns counsel against a regime that would
apply special rules in environmental law cases. According to the Supreme
Court, principles of stare decisis weigh in favor of retaining existing legal
rules, particularly when those rules have instilled reliance,118 unless the rules
have become intolerably unworkable,119 or legal or factual circumstances have
changed so significantly that the existing legal rules ought to be replaced.120
Applying different legal rules in environmental cases than in other similarly
situated types of cases runs into the problem that courts have simply not
done this before.
Although replacing an administrative law rule (say, the one about
refusing to review agency decisions not to enforce121) with a somewhat
different rule in environmental law cases may not quite be the same as
overruling that rule, and thus may not squarely implicate stare decisis
principles, those principles nonetheless recommend against such a change.
Carving out an area of law for special treatment where no special treatment
has yet to be applied would represent a radical and paradigmatic change in
the legal system. Before implementing such a change, courts should ask
whether the change would unduly interfere with settled expectations and
undermine the import of precedent. These are the same questions that are
posed by the stare decisis inquiry. Although a full analysis of all the stare
decisis factors will not be recited here, it is worth noting that the doctrine
See LAZARUS, supra n. 11, at 11-12
Of course, this problem might be avoided if the paradigm were changed to endorse
special rules only for those environmental cases that implicate catastrophic and irreparable
harms, but such an alteration would cause quite difficult administrative problems of its
own—most notably, how would courts determine whether their particular environmental
case in fact implicates catastrophic and irreparable harms?
118 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992)
(asking “whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to
the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation”).
119 Id. (“[W]e may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying
practical workability.”).
120 Id. at 855 (asking “whether related principles of law have so far developed as to have left
the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine” and “whether facts have so
changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant
application or justification”).
121 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
116
117
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erects a presumption against change. It is also worth observing that the
current system is certainly not unworkable, that there have been no major
legal or factual changes that call that system into question,122 and that the
government has certainly relied on current administrative and constitutional
law doctrine in organizing its response to environmental problems, a reliance
that would likely induce hardship if the system were to suffer sudden radical
change.
Fifth, to the extent that the paradigm of special treatment rests on
the uniqueness of environmental harms,123 it is undermined by the fact that,
while ecological injuries may be remarkable, they are not clearly entirely
distinct from harms in other areas of law. Indeed, other areas of law
potentially involve harms that possess all of the characteristics that Lazarus
points to as distinguishing ecological harms. For example, although some
environmental injuries may indeed be potentially long-term and catastrophic,
this may also be true of injuries in the health law field (e.g., HHS regulation of
biohazards and disease causing agents), in the fields of international relations
and military affairs, and even in regulation of the economy, since who could
deny the possible wide-ranging and catastrophic effects of, for example, a
national economic depression? Likewise, environmental harms are not the
only types of harms that may be geographically and temporally disconnected
from the source of the harms; domestic immigration laws have substantial
impacts around the globe, for example, and the effects of health regulations
relating to pregnant women and children may be felt years or generations in
the future. Environmental problems may often be characterized by difficult
causation issues, but so are economic problems, and although environmental
interests are often difficult to value economically, other types of interests—
dignitary interests implicated by labor law or occupational safety law come to
mind, as do equality interests raised by disability and civil rights laws—are
characterized by the same valuation problems. None of this is meant to
minimize the importance of ecological injury or even to suggest that
environmental injuries are not quite remarkable compared generally to other
types of injuries. To say that environmental injuries are entirely unique in
terms of their characteristics, however, is to minimize the importance of
harms involved in other areas of law.
Sixth, even if courts were to reject the previous rationale and
determine that environmental injuries are different in kind from other types
of injuries, they might still be faced with an important slippery slope
problem. Although environmental harms may be particularly remarkable in
terms of their potentially catastrophic impacts, geographical and temporal
The best counter-argument here might be that we perhaps appreciate environmental
problems differently (as more significant) now than in earlier decades when much of
environmental law was created. An argument might also be made that environmental
problems are more significant now, although this claim would be undermined by the
excellent success enjoyed by environmental regulation since the 1970s.
123 See Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 744-48.
122
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fluidity, and other characteristics, surely harms in all other (or at least most
other) areas of law can also plausibly lay some claim to uniqueness in one way
or another. For example, one might argue that harms in the health law field
are particularly significant since human beings rely on their health to exercise
all other rights and to enjoy all other interests. Immigration and foreign
relations lawyers could credibly argue that harms in their field are uniquely
widespread geographically. In employment law and perhaps in some areas of
business or economic law, injured parties could argue that their injuries are
uniquely tied to their senses of identity. Those claiming violations of their
civil rights clearly could argue with a great deal of persuasiveness that the
government has injured them in a particularly harmful manner. Embracing
the notion that different legal rules should apply to different areas of
regulation would threaten to open a Pandora’s box of claims for
distinctiveness that could destabilize the legal system, cause a great deal of
uncertainty, and bring about an administrative nightmare for the courts.
Seventh, it is important to realize that any special treatment for
environmental law would undermine the goals served by rules that currently
apply in cross-cutting areas of law like administrative or constitutional law.124
Courts have developed these rules to serve important purposes. For
example, the Chevron rule promotes accountability of decision-making by
placing interpretive authority in the hands of presidentially-controlled
agencies instead of courts125 and promotes good decision-making by placing
that authority in the hands of experts rather than judges.126 The rule allowing
changes to proposed rules that are material outgrowths of those rules ensures
that agencies have the flexibility to respond to comments while also making
sure they provide adequate notice to interested parties.127 The rule that
courts will generally not review agency decisions not to enforce statutes gives
agencies the authority they need to prioritize scarce enforcement resources.128
Whatever benefits might accrue from having a special rule applicable to
environmental law cases would have to be balanced against whatever benefits
are lost by replacing the general rule with the more specific environmental
law rule. So, for example, if the Chevron rule were replaced in environmental
cases with a rule that would afford less judicial deference to agency
interpretations, then whatever gains the new rule would bring would have to
be balanced against the loss of accountability and expertise that would accrue
This particular point is listed seventh because it logically fits best in that position, not
because it is the second most important point of the eight.
125 See, e.g., Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. REG. 283, 309
(1986) (observing that Chevron is a good rule because it vests “supervisory oversight” in the
“political branches, those directly accountable to the people”). Of course, this line of
accountability is far more direct with respect to decisions made by the so-called executive
agencies, whose heads serve at the pleasure of the President, as opposed to the independent
agencies, whose heads are protected from removal by the President. For the classic cases
upholding the constitutionality of independent agencies, see Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
126 See Starr, supra n. 125, at 309-10 (discussing agency expertise).
127 See, e.g., Chocolate M’frs Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103-04 (4th Cir. 1985).
128 See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831-32 (1985).
124
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from taking interpretational authority away from agencies. Likewise, if
agencies were provided with less flexibility in environmental cases to depart
from proposed rules when issuing their final rules, whatever benefits would
accrue from this new approach would have to be balanced against the lost
benefits from the old approach, including the benefit that agencies need not
enter into costly new rounds of notice and comment procedures whenever
they feel it necessary to adapt their rules to insightful comments of interested
parties.
Finally, and most importantly, adopting special rules for use in
environmental law cases is theoretically unwarranted as a matter of principle.
Rules adopted in cross-cutting areas of law are rightly uniform across subject
areas because they deal with identical concerns that do not differ by subject
matter. For example, administrative law rules govern (primarily) agency
behavior and judicial control of agency policy-making, and are aimed at
creating some sort of sensible regime given the odd location of agencies in
the constitutional structure as a level of government possessing quasiindependence from the three main branches of government. Constitutional
law delineates the powers and limits of government actors, as established by
constitutional text and history. Federal court access doctrines are created to
manage access to courts for the purpose of preserving and maximizing
judicial resources and maintaining a workable separation of powers between
the judiciary and the other two branches of government. In none of these
areas of law is there any formal reason to differentiate rules among subject
matters, because the subject matter is irrelevant to the purposes served by the
rules.
The fundamental cross-cutting concerns embodied by administrative,
constitutional, and federal court access rules are the same in the
environmental context as in any other factual context. With regard to
administrative law, for example, environmental agencies such as EPA or the
Department of the Interior are not any different from non-environmental
agencies such as the Treasury Department or HHS with respect to their
location in the structure of American government, the amount of policy
discretion they are provided, or any other concern relevant to the shaping of
administrative law rules. Likewise, as a state actor, environmental agencies
are subject to the same constitutional limits as any other state actor; the
Constitution, in other words, does not single out environmental actors in a
way that would justify the application of special rules to them. Similar
analysis is applicable to federal court access doctrines.129
129 Of course, it is certainly the case that courts have in fact applied many special rules to
particular areas of law, including some areas of environmental law. Some of these special
rules—for example, the rule of lenity in criminal law, see, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524
U.S. 125, 138 (1998), and the rule that requires Congress to clearly state its intent to intrude
on areas of historical state concern, see, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
United States Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001)—are better characterized as
rules intrinsic to cross-cutting areas of law like criminal law and constitutional law (much like
Chevron is a rule intrinsic to administrative law) than as special rules applying only to certain
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2.

Modify General Rules.

Because it also involves applying different substantive tests to
environmental cases than other types of cases, the second paradigm is subject
to the same criticisms that are relevant to the first paradigm. Even though in
the second paradigm, courts would be applying the same formal tests, they
would be applying them somewhat differently in environmental cases than in
other cases, and thus all of the problems involved with carving out a special
judicial regime for environmental law cases would apply. Indeed, the second
paradigm would probably be even worse than the first paradigm, in that by
applying the same formal legal tests, courts would be giving the impression
that they are treating environmental cases the same as other cases, which
would in fact not be true. The confusion that this would engender for other
courts and practitioners constitutes an independent reason for rejecting the
second paradigm.
subject matters falling within those cross-cutting areas of law (even though, for example, the
rule of lenity applies in some civil cases that resemble criminal ones). But other rules, such
as the rule construing land grants in favor of the sovereign, see Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc.,
462 U.S. 36, 59 (1983), the rule construing ambiguous statutes in favor of Indian tribes, see
Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 93 (2001), and the plenary power doctrine
in immigration law, see, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952), may
rightfully be characterized as special rules applying only to certain subject matters or issues.
Moreover, environmental law itself has recognized some of these kinds of special
rules. For example, the public trust doctrine appears to be a judicially created rule that limits
the sovereign’s ability to take actions harmful to navigable waters (and perhaps other natural
resources as well). See generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W.
Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really Happened in Illinois Central,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004). The area of “water law”—often understood as a separate
area of law from environmental law, even though it concerns one of the most important
aspects of the natural environment—is perhaps the most extreme example of an area of
environmental law in which unique rules are applied, see generally JOSEPH L. SAX, BARTON H.
THOMPSON, JR., JOHN D. LESHY & ROBERT H. ABRAMS, LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER
RESOURCES: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 2000), although it is distinguishable from the
field of federal environmental law that is chiefly the topic of this Article, because it is
primarily an area of state law (much like tort law or property law, both of which are also
relevant to environmental law generally). Federal public lands law also has seen the
application of unique rules, such as the rule of U.S. v. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915)
(later overruled by the Federal Land Policy Management Act), which held that the President
could withdraw certain areas of land from the public domain without specific Congressional
authorization, because Congress had not objected to the practice.
The existence of these special rules, however, does not counsel in favor of adopting
new special rules that apply to all environmental law cases, though it does, to some extent,
demonstrate that the law is able to handle the creation of some specific rules that are unique
to certain factual contexts without become an unmanageable mess (though some might
disagree that the law has not become such a mess). Some of the rules are long-standing
elements of the American legal system which have become part of the reasonable
expectations of citizens living within that system and are thus distinguishable from any new
sort of fact-specific rule. Others may be justified by unique features of the legal area they
govern, as may be the case with special immigration law rules which may be linked to
constitutional norms. And still others may simply be unjustified as a normative matter, as
would any large scale creation of special environmental law rules.
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3.

Consider the Environment When Forming General Rules.

Whether courts ought to embrace the third paradigm turns on
whether courts properly rely on their evaluation of the real world effects of
their rules when crafting them. If such reliance is proper, then it would only
make sense for courts to consider possible environmental effects, taking into
account the unique features of ecological injury, when crafting those rules.
Otherwise, courts would be leaving out an important relevant factor from
their consideration. Of course, courts would also want to consider the
effects of their rules on other areas of law, to the extent that those areas
present unique concerns. The amount of information that courts ideally
should take into account when crafting rules of general applicability counsels
in favor of developing these rules incrementally, rather than all at once.130
The easiest case for judges relying on their evaluation of real-world
effects when crafting legal rules involves the creation of rules that make no
reference to external sources of law, such as when judges create prudential
rules governing access to judicial fora or when they otherwise make rules
which resemble federal common law. This latter category includes much of
administrative law, which one prominent scholar has described as “a kind of
common law of administrative procedure.”131 Sometimes courts are relatively
explicit in describing these rules as primarily the result of judicial creation, as
for example in the area of standing, where the Court has explicitly described
the “zone of interests” and other limitations as “prudential” in nature,
contrasting these limits with those derived from the text of Article III.132
Other times, the identification of these rules as primarily creatures of judicial
creativity (as opposed to derivations from external sources of law) is more
ambiguous. Examples include the ripeness doctrine, which the Court has
described as being both “drawn both from Article III imitations on judicial
power and from prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction,”133
and perhaps the mootness doctrine as well, which, as the Chief Justice has
explained, contains exceptions that are very hard to square with the notion
that the doctrine is constitutionally based.134 Other rules, such as the Chevron
rule, may be superficially located by the Court in some form of external
authority but are in fact created by the Court based on its own evaluation of
the interests served by the rule.135 Indeed, many (if not most) administrative
See text accompanying notes 58-68, supra.
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, U. CHI. KENT. L. REV. 1039,
1039 (1997).
132 See Elk Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09 (2004).
133 National Park Hospitality Association v. Department of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003)
(quotations and citations omitted).
134 See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330-31 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (explaining
how the “capable of repetition but evading review” exception to the mootness doctrine can
only be explained if mootness is a prudential rule rather than being rooted in Article III).
135 See David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 S.CT. REV. 201,
212 (2003) (“Chevron is a congressional doctrine only in the sense that Congress can
130
131

33

The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law

law rules, though formally located in some external source of law such as the
APA or Article II of the Constitution, are in fact organically developed by
courts based on their evaluation of the rules’ practical effects.136 When
courts create such rules, they are virtually unconstrained in the types of
factors they may consider. It would make little sense for courts to ignore the
practical effects of their rules if there is any way for them to predict what
those effects would be.
When courts are interpreting external sources of law, such as statutes
and constitutional text, the question of whether reliance on real world
implications is obviously more problematic. Many influential jurists and
scholars have argued that courts should ignore these implications and focus
their inquiries solely on more objective factors—the language of the statute’s
text, most notably.137 Such a focus, it is argued, among other things,
dissuades unaccountable judges from simply acting as ad-hoc minilegislatures, enacting their political preferences into law.138 Nonetheless,
prominent theories of interpretation, both at the statutory and constitutional
level, support the judicial practice of looking at real world implications of
various interpretive choices. For example, in the statutory context, Professor
Eskridge has developed a sophisticated interpretive approach which calls on
courts to look to practical effects and consequences, among other things,
when settling upon any particular statutory interpretation.139 Other legal
scholars have adopted similar pragmatic approaches to statutory

overturn it; in all other respects, Chevron is a judicial construction, reflecting implicit policy
judgments about what interpretive practices make for good government.”).
136 See id; Merrill, supra n. 131, at 1039 (noting that in interpreting the APA, “the dominant
trend has been toward the creation of a kind of common law of administrative procedure,
with each generation of judges reworking the law in accordance with its perception of the
‘felt necessities of the time.’”).
137 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1184
(1989) (“[I]t is perhaps easier for me than it is for some judges to develop general rules,
because I am more inclined to adhere closely to the plain meaning of a text.”); John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 675 (1997)
(articulating a constitutional argument for textualist statutory interpretive theory).
138 See Lillian R. BeVier, The Moment and the Millennium: The Question of Time, Or Law?, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1112, 1117 (1998) (“One reason textualists are textualists is that they are
tenaciously devoted to an ideal of legitimacy that requires judicial decision making to be
constrained by objective standards and criteria external to the judges themselves. To
textualists, the rule of law and the premises of democratic government are unacceptably
threatened by judicial subjectivity or ad hoc decision making, or by the prospect of judges
yielding to the temptation to decide cases according to their own personal values solely
because they have the power to issue injunctions and proclaim results.”).
139 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 175-76
(1994) (“Statutory interpretation should be pragmatic, in that the interpreter has a
responsibility to take practice seriously and consider the consequences of different
interpretive choices.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L.
REV. 1479, 1529 (“The role of the courts, therefore, is to be further deliberative filters, as
envisioned by Hamilton, mitigating the effects of unwise laws and exploring their full
consequences.”) (1987); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
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interpretation.140 In the constitutional context, pragmatic theories which call
for courts to consider the real world effects of their decisions are also highly
prominent.141
As noted above, this Article will not address in any comprehensive
manner the scholarly debates over the proper approaches that courts should
adopt when interpreting constitutional text and legislative enactments. My
own sympathies lie with those who argue in favor of looking to

See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Do Theories of Statutory Interpretation Matter?, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
1409, 1414-16 (2000) (describing pragmatism of Richard Posner as well as of Eskridge); Peter
C. Schank, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory Interpretation, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2589 (1992) (“Pragmatism may now represent the principal theoretical
approach to statutory interpretation in legal scholarship. Neopragmatists Richard Posner,
William Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and Daniel Farber have perhaps written more extensively
on this topic than anyone in the past decade. Although they differ in many respects, each is
committed to a method of interpretation that recognizes the absence of a philosophical
foundation to any theory of interpretation, the inadequacy of any one-dimensional guide to
interpretation, and the need to take into account both the conventions of law and the likely
practical consequences accruing from an interpretation.”) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added)); T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L. J. 943, 955-58
(1987) (describing academic support for legal pragmatism); id. at 957 (“Pragmatism reassured
legal scholars that abandonment of the goal of formal certainty did not necessarily entail
nihilism; on the contrary, it liberated scholars to develop and test new rules for new social
conditions.”); Matthew A. Edwards, Posner’s Pragmatism and Payton Home Arrests, 77 WASH. L.
REV. 299, 393 (2002) (describing Richard Posner’s pragmatism as follows: “According to
Posner, legal decisionmakers, including judges, should use every tool at their disposal,
especially the social sciences, to render decisions that will best serve our society's needs.
Judges can accomplish this goal only if they understand the factual contexts in which legal
issues arise and are capable of determining the practical effects of their decisions.”).
141 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra n. 140, at 1001 (describing prominent theory of constitutional
balancing (even while critiquing what balancing has become) as follows: “Balancing was a
liberating methodology at the outset. It took blinders off judges' eyes and let them openly
take into account the connections between constitutional law and the real world. Preaching a
pragmatic, realistic approach to constitutional law, it promised doctrine arrived at objectively
and grounded in the facts of the society to which it applied.”); Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic
Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 246-47 (2002) (“[M]y discussion will illustrate an
approach to constitutional interpretation that places considerable weight upon
consequences--consequences valued in terms of basic constitutional purposes. It disavows a
contrary constitutional approach, a more ‘legalistic’ approach that places too much weight
upon language, history, tradition, and precedent alone while understating the importance of
consequences.”); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword: The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 8 (1998) (“What can the Court do to overcome its limited ability to adjust its
doctrines to the rapidly changing world? Explicitly paying greater attention to the likely
consequences of its decisions and to the empirical assumptions underlying its doctrines
would be a step in the right direction, because even if one believes that courts are meant to
be fora of principle rather than policy, any sound account of the role of courts should make
real-world experience relevant to adjudication.”) (footnotes omitted); Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1332 (1988) (“Constitutional law needs
no grand theoretical foundation. None is likely ever to be forthcoming, and none is
desirable. Instead, legal pragmatism is a sufficient basis for constitutional law. Legal
pragmatism--which essentially means solving legal problems using every tool that comes to
hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy--renounces the entire
project of providing a theoretical foundation for constitutional law.”).
140
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consequences, at least when the relevant legal materials are indeterminate,142
but I will not defend those sympathies at length here. It is worth noting,
however, that, as scholarship in the field of law and religion and elsewhere
has persuasively argued, judges cannot fully bracket their personal beliefs,
biases, and experiences when deciding cases,143 at least in cases involving
substantial indeterminacy.144 Judges are human, and as much as some critics
might like them to approach each case with a blank slate and to decide the
question before them in a fully objective fashion, such decision-making in
difficult cases is simply impossible in the real world. Furthermore, since this
reliance on personal experience and belief is at some level inevitable in cases
involving substantial indeterminacy, it makes little sense to suggest that such
reliance is improper. It would be hard to argue in any but the most
theoretical sense that something which is descriptively impossible is also
normatively desirable.145 If reliance on personal experience and belief in
difficult cases is both inevitable and normatively acceptable, it seems
improper, if not incoherent, to ask judges not to look also at the
consequences of their decisions. And, indeed, it is probably the case that
judges almost surely do rely on their evaluation of consequences when
deciding difficult cases. 146

142 In cases when the legal materials are clear or fairly clear, I would argue that courts should
seek to implement the intent of elected officials. I should make clear that I do not believe
that a substantial amount of indeterminacy exists in every or even most environmental law
cases, particularly those that involve interpretation of statutes as opposed to constitutional
provisions. See, e.g., John C. Nagle, Newt Gingrich, Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 2209, 2220-36 (noting that as both a descriptive and normative matter, there are easy
statutory interpretation cases). See also Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, Strict Textualism, 29 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 13, 35-36 (1995) (“[E]asy interpretation cases are never easy simply because of
the text, but only because the text in its legal, social, and historical context is easy to
interpret.”). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987). But see generally, Joseph William Singer, The Player and
the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. J. 1 (1984) (describing indeterminacy theories).
143 See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 144 (1995)
(“Can judges decide free of personal moral convictions? The answer is that they cannot
entirely; fundamental beliefs will influence decision even when judges conscientiously try to
exclude them.”); Scott C. Idleman, The Limits of Religious Values in Judicial Decisionmaking, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 537, 543-44 (1998) (“For the recognizably religious judge, it would appear
that religious values often constitute an unavoidable source of insight and authority . . . . To
the extent such values may influence judges at a subconscious level, as first principles
paradigmatically do, this unavoidability may even extend to those judges who deliberately
attempt to steer clear of their religious commitments when rendering decisions.”).
144 See, e.g., Idleman, supra n. 143, at 544 (noting that reliance on religious reasons “may only
be apparent in situations where the positive law is substantially underdeterminate or where
the substance of the dispute directly implicates fundamental or controversial ethical issues”).
145 Kent Greenawalt, The Perceived Authority of Law in Judging Constitutional Cases, 61 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 783, 786 (1990) (“Ordinarily a normative theory should not call for behavior
that is impossible or extremely difficult.”).
146 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra n. 139, at 6-105 (1994) (arguing that, as a descriptive matter,
courts in fact interpret statutes dynamically rather than statically); Aleinikoff, supra n. 140, at
953-954 (describing move in the Supreme Court in the 1920s toward “realism in
constitutional adjudication”).
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Of course, if one rejects the idea that courts should look beyond text
to determine the meaning of constitutional or statutory provisions, then
consideration of external contemporary facts, such as the unique features of
ecological injury, will play little role in guiding one’s interpretation. For
purposes of the rest of this Article, though, I will assume that such
consideration is indeed proper, as part of a larger, multi-contextual
interpretive inquiry that seeks to find the most reasonable understanding of
the meaning of contested text, at least in cases in which the legal text being
interpreted is highly indeterminate.
If it is proper for courts to consider how their interpretations will
play out in the real world, then the case for considering the unique features
of ecological injury is fairly straightforward. Why would courts choose to
ignore these features as a general rule? In any given case, those features
might not be particularly relevant, but it would make little sense for courts to
preclude consideration of them ex ante. In some cases, the features may in
fact be quite relevant. For example, the potentially catastrophic and
irreversible nature of environmental injury would seem to be a quite relevant
consideration in the development of any constitutional rule that would limit
plaintiffs’ access to the courts to remedy environmental harms, such as the
Article III standing doctrine.147
Of course, if courts may consider the effects of the rules they create,
either through pure construction or through creative interpretation, then
ideally they should consider all of those effects in all of their aspects,
including effects that have nothing to do with the environment or even that
run counter to environmental goals. For example, in addition to ecological
considerations, part of the Court’s inquiry in crafting constitutional standing
rules ought to be the economic and administrative costs of broadening or
limiting access to the courts for the purpose of challenging allegedly
environmentally unfriendly regulations. The Court would also ideally want to
think about how whatever rules it settles on will play out in nonenvironmental legal contexts, such as in banking and immigration law
settings, just to name two examples. Obviously, this is a difficult, probably
impossible, task to fulfill in its entirety.148 Nonetheless, the more courts can
expand the set of potential effects they consider when fashioning rules, the
more likely it is that they can create rules that not only accurately reflect the
relevant text and purpose, but also are well suited to govern real world
problems. The need to consider a vast array of potential contexts and effects
counsels in favor of courts developing rules incrementally, through trial and
error, tailoring these rules to new situations as they become more familiar
This Article will not address the precise extent that judges ought to look at consequences
as opposed to other factors when interpreting indeterminate text, but of course that is a very
important question for the proper understanding of the judicial role in the environmental
law context.
148 It is important to realize that a court might fulfill its task of considering the practical
effects of a particular rule or interpretation through discussion or thinking that does not
necessarily end up reflected in the written opinion produced by the court.
147
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with the myriad ways that the rules interact with the countless factual settings
in which the law plays an important role.
4.

Faithfully Apply Environmental Facts to Law.

The most apparent way that courts ought to take the unique features
of ecological injury into account is by faithfully paying attention to those
features when applying facts to law, if those features are relevant to the legal
rule, principle, or test that the court is applying. This responsibility follows
directly from the obligation that courts have to apply facts to law in specific
cases. That obligation is to apply facts as they actually exist to the extent the
true nature of the facts can be discerned.149 Courts are not authorized to
make up facts, consciously change facts that have been presented to them, or
ignore facts that are relevant to whatever legal test they are applying. Thus,
to the extent that the remarkable features of ecological injury happen to be
relevant to the applicable legal test, courts have an obligation to apply those
features accurately and faithfully.
At least three types of cases will require courts to pay special
attention to the uniqueness of ecological injury. The first set of cases
includes any case in which an agency is required to consider or articulate the
ecological risks of some proposed government action (or government
approval of a private action). In these cases, courts must assure that agencies
have accurately considered the extent and nature of those environmental
risks, which in turn will require the courts themselves to be cognizant of the
extent and nature of the risks. For example, NEPA requires agencies
preparing an environmental impact statement in connection with certain
major federal actions to consider “the environmental impact of the proposed
action”150 and “any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided.”151 The EPA’s wetland fill permit regulations prohibit the Corps of
Engineers from granting a permit if there is a practicable alternative to the
proposed project that “does not have . . . significant adverse environmental
consequences.”152 The Clean Water Act requires the EPA, when identifying
the “best conventional pollutant control technology” that plants in certain
categories must apply to the emission of certain non-toxic pollutants, to
consider “the reasonableness of the relationship between the costs of
obtaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction benefits

See, e.g., Sheets v. Selden, 74 U.S. 416, 424 (1868) (“This court cannot interpolate what the
contract does not contain. We can only apply the law to the facts as we find them.”); IT
Corporation v. General American Life Insurance Company, 107 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir.
1997) (“Federal appellate judges merely apply law to facts within a framework of statutes,
rules, and precedent which binds them, but because of the multifariousness of facts and
complexities of application of this elaborate framework, the task often involves difficult and
close questions of judgment.”)
150 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i).
151 Id. § 4332(C)(ii).
152 40 C.F.R. § 230.10(a).
149
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derived.”153 The Endangered Species Act requires the Fish and Wildlife
Service, when deciding whether to list a particular species as endangered or
threatened, to consider a variety of causes for the possible decline of the
species,154 including the catch-all factor “other natural or manmade factors
affecting [the species’] continued existence.”155 The National Park Service
Organic Act requires the Park Service to “provide for the enjoyment of [the
natural resources within the national parks] in such manner and by such
means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future
generations.”156 All of these provisions require that the relevant agency
consider the extent and nature of ecological risks in some way; courts called
upon to review whether the agency has fulfilled its legal obligations will need
to evaluate whether the agency has properly understood the nature and
extent of the ecological risks it has considered.
A second set of cases are those that require courts themselves to
balance the seriousness of potential ecological injury against some other
factor or factors in determining whether a particular government or private
action passes legal muster. The procedural due process inquiry under the
Court’s longstanding Matthews v. Eldridge rule is a good example of this type
of case. Under that test, a court evaluating whether the government has
provided sufficient process prior to depriving some private party of a
protected property or liberty interest must consider not only the importance
of the private interest and the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest
that results from the alleged lack of process provided, but the strength of the
government interest as well. In some cases, this could involve the
government’s interest in preventing some ecological injury.157
For example, in the case of Reardon v. United States,158 the First Circuit
Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether the EPA had violated a
private property owner’s procedural due process rights by placing a notice of
lien on the property to cover costs incurred by a government cleanup of
hazardous substances on the property without a prior hearing. The majority
of the court found that the lack of a hearing did violate the owner’s due
process interest, noting that the government’s interest in placing the notice of
33 U.S.C. § 304(b)(4(B).
16 U.S.C. § 1534(a)(1).
155 Id. § 1534(a)(1)(E).
156 16 U.S.C. § 1.
157 Another relevant example is the balancing test that courts are called on to apply when
acting in equity to determine whether to issue a preliminary injunction against an activity that
is allegedly harming the environment. That inquiry requires courts to consider whether the
plaintiffs have demonstrated a possibility of irreparable injury. See, e.g., Earth Island Institute
v. Mosbacher, 746 F.Supp. 964, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1990). Such an inquiry, as the Supreme
Court has recognized, will ordinarily result in a finding that an injunction is necessary, due to
the irreparable nature of ecological injury. See, e.g., Amoco Production Co. v. Gambell, 480
U.S. 531, 545 (1987) (“Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately
remedied by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e.
irreparable.”).
158 947 F.2d 1509 (1st Cir. 1991).
153
154
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lien was minimal, given the fact that the government had no prior recognized
interest in the property.159 The dissent, on the other hand, disagreed with the
majority’s analysis with respect to the government’s interest in protecting its
large investment in the cleanup of the property, observing that without such
protection the government might have fewer “resources available for
response actions at other contaminated sites.”160 Because this would
“significantly affec[t] the EPA’s financial ability to cope with a health and
environmental problem so massive that it hardly admits of cost
quantification,”161 the dissenting judge concluded that the government’s
interest in placing the lien notice was substantial.162 The dissent’s
consideration of the extent of the ecological harm as one aspect of the
government’s interest in securing payment for its cleanup of hazardous
substances was the correct approach under this paradigm of environmental
law judicial decision-making.
Finally, there may be cases in which the nature of ecological injury
(causation and valuation difficulties, geographical and temporal fluidity, etc.)
will be relevant to the court’s analysis. Professor Lazarus illustrates this in
part of his critique of the Court’s decision in Lujan. Lazarus argues that by
requiring the plaintiff to “possess some particularized professional or direct
physical relation to the species at issue,” “[t]he Court . . . too swiftly denies
the legitimacy of. . . psychological and emotional tie[s] to aspects of the
natural environment.”163 Assuming, as I do, that Lazarus is right about the
unique psychological and emotional ties that many people feel toward the
environment, the problem could be framed as either a failure of the Court
properly to follow the third paradigm (consider environmental knowledge
when framing general rules) or failure to follow this paradigm. Either the
problem is that the Court has framed a legal test that specifically excludes real
psychological injuries even though by doing so it has effectively precluded a
vast number of potential environmental lawsuits that seek to redress real
problems (failure in paradigm #3), or it has framed a test that would allow
for suits to redress real psychological injuries but has failed to appreciate that
damage to the environment can indeed cause such injuries (failure in
paradigm #4).164 Expounding further on this critique of Lujan, one could
certainly argue that the Court’s failure to consider seriously the plaintiffs’
“ecosystem nexus” theory for standing,165 which rested on the notion that
Id. at 1520-22.
Id. at 1530 (Cyr, J., dissenting).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 751.
164 Although it is not entirely clear, I believe that the Court’s failure was more of the
paradigm #4 variety than the paradigm #3 variety. The Court suggests that the plaintiffs
were not “directly” or “imminently” injured. See 504 U.S. at 563-4. The emotional and
psychological injuries suffered by the plaintiffs, however, were direct and imminently felt;
they just weren’t injuries that were brought about by actually going to Sir Lanka or the Nile
and not finding the endangered animals present.
165 504 U.S. at 565.
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ecosystems are interconnected in a significant way, also constituted a failure
of the Court to understand the true nature of ecological injury.166
The remarkable features of ecological injury, however, will not be
relevant to the resolution of every legal controversy involving the
environment. For example, in the case of United States v. Bestfoods,167 which
Lazarus criticizes,168 the Court correctly concluded that, unless the corporate
veil deserves to be pierced, a parent corporation cannot be held liable under
CERCLA for the acts of its subsidiary “simply because its subsidiary is
subject to liability for owning or operating a polluting facility.”169 In reaching
this conclusion (and implicitly rejecting the district court’s suggestion that a
parent corporation might be held liable under CERCLA for exerting power
or influence over the subsidiary itself, as opposed to the polluting facility170),
the Court noted that Congress enacted CERCLA fully aware of the
“venerable common-law” rule that parent corporations are generally not held
liable for actions of their subsidiaries and that “nothing in CERCLA purports
to reject this bedrock principle.”171 Although it may be the case that holding
parents liable for the actions of their subsidiaries would decrease the amount
of aggregate ecological injury relative to the common law rule, the fact that
ecological injury has catastrophic, long-term impacts is irrelevant to the
resolution of the legal question, which turns on whether Congress intended
to alter the common law rule, the answer to which can be determined by
reading the very clear statute (and perhaps the legislative history) and not by
asking anything about the nature of ecological injury itself.
5.

Rhetoric and Advice.

As noted above,172 one could imagine a practically unlimited number
of variations on a judicial paradigm dealing with the use of language in
opinion writing.173 Between the diametrically opposed poles of “no rhetoric
or advice” and “any rhetoric or advice” lie a number of intermediate
positions that would distinguish acceptable language from non-acceptable
language on a variety of axes, including purpose, type of opinion, type of
language, and amount of language. Given the size of the topic, providing an
exhaustive treatment here of what kinds of judicial language should be
considered acceptable and non-acceptable in environmental cases would be
impossible. Instead, in the following paragraphs, the Article will provide
See Robert W. Adler, The Supreme Court and Ecosystems: Environmental Science in Environmental
Law, 27 VT. L. REV. 249, 341, 360-61 (2003) (noting that Justice Scalia’s opinion in Lujan,
“highlight[s] the implications of the failure of individual justices, or the Court as a whole, to
consider applicable principles of ecosystem science, or to apply them properly”).
167 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
168 Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 757-58.
169 524 U.S. at 62.
170 See id. at 58-59 (quoting district court decision).
171 Id. at 62.
172 See text accompanying notes 73-75, supra.
173 See nn. 73-74, supra.
166
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some brief thoughts regarding what types of judicial language are most
appropriate and which types of rhetoric or advice judges should avoid.
It is worth considering advice first, and then rhetoric. As Judge
Mikva has pointed out, the notion that judges ought to provide other
branches of government with their advice regarding possible policy
alternatives is highly problematic.174 Judges are not policy experts, and they
are neither elected by the people nor accountable to them.175 As such, not
only are they not well-situated to provide much help regarding policy
choices, but it is also unlikely that the political branches of government will
care much about their opinions.176 These three objections to judicial advicegiving—what Mikva terms “capacity,” “efficacy,” and “legitimacy”177—
counsel strongly against judges engaging in broad-ranging policy advice that
is unrelated to the roles they play as judges.178 This would include
environmentally-related policy advice such as urging Congress to pass (or
repeal) certain types of environmentally protective statutes or urging agencies
to issue regulations to provide added protection to the natural environment
(or to industry).
On the other hand, however, courts are well-situated by virtue of
their location in the structure of American government and the nature of
their functions to contribute certain types of insights into the policy-making
process. Unlike legislators or agency decision-makers (for the most part),
judges (at least theoretically) deal with specific controversies, engage in
principled decision-making, listen to both or all sides of the controversy
before reaching a decision, are politically unaffiliated, and generally justify
their decisions with reasoned and somewhat detailed written opinions.179 As
a result, judges may have unique perspectives on peripheral issues that arise
in cases which they could usefully articulate to the public and to the other
branches of government.
If judges closely tether the rhetoric, advice, and observations that
they contribute to their strengths, their roles and obligations, and their
position with respect to the other branches, then much of the force of the
objections to the use of advice-giving by judges falls away. For example, if
the advice judges offer relates closely to their obligations to consider detailed
factual circumstances and employ principled reasoning, two of their
See Abner Mikva, Why Judges Should Not Be Advicegivers: A Response to Professor Neal Katyal, 50
STAN. L. REV. 1825, 1825 (1998).
175 Id. at 1828-29.
176 Id. at 1828.
177 Id. at 1827-29. Mikva doesn’t actually endorse the “efficacy” critique, saying instead that
it “may be a criticism” of judicial advice-giving “that [he] is not willing to make.” Id. at
1828.
178 But see generally Katyal, supra n. 74 (defending advice-giving in constitutional cases).
179 See Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary
Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 600-07 (1991) (listing some of the unique
characteristics of judicial decision-making).
174
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strengths, as opposed simply to articulating their policy preferences, they are
both more likely to be able to provide useful advice (“capacity”) and are
more likely to be listened to by the citizenry and the other branches
(“efficacy”). Likewise, to the extent that such types of advice are better
viewed as providing assistance to the other branches as opposed to chastising
or lecturing or encouraging them, the accountability problems (“legitimacy”)
are also substantially reduced, as judges would simply be helping the other
branches reach good policy decisions rather than dictating what those
decisions ought to be.
In my view, there are at least three important areas in which courts
can distribute useful and legitimate information and advice. First, courts can
point out very specific problems that they notice with respect to statutes
under their review which Congress might not know about or understand.
The goal here would be to inform Congress of problems with its legislation
that Congress could then seek to remedy by amending the statute. Judge
Mikva points out in his article how the D.C. Circuit has already experimented
with this idea.180 Second, if a court rejects a party’s argument but sees an
alternative way that the party might achieve its goal, the court might point
how the party could go about pursuing its goal and what its likelihood of
success would be in the courts. For example, if a court found a particular
statute unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause, it could provide some
rough thoughts to Congress (and parties supporting the statute) regarding
how the statute might be re-worked to have a better chance of success. Such
advice, to the extent it is possible to provide, serves the important goal of
helping policymakers avoid wasteful efforts in devising solutions that will
ultimately be invalidated by the courts. Third, if in the course of hearing and
deciding a case, a court learns about some activity or inactivity, either by the
government or some private party, that it believes the public and the other
branches have an interest in learning about (and which is not protected by
privilege or statute or other source of law), the court should disseminate and
emphasize that information in its opinion. Spreading such information, far
from suffering from accountability or legitimacy problems, will in fact serve
to promote the transparency and accountability of government and private
actors by ensuring that the public and other interested parties are fully
informed.
Each of these types of advice or information-giving are relevant for
environmental decision-making. With respect to informing Congress of
statutory problems, environmental law is filled with poorly-drafted statutes
that raise all sorts of problems which could be brought to the attention of
Congress by the courts. For example, although many of its problems are by
now well-known, CERCLA is a statute that suffers from countless drafting
errors and ambiguities which courts might have pointed out to Congress as

180

See Mikva, supra n. 174, at 1828.
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soon as they started dealing with interpretive questions regarding the Act.181
The second type of judicial advice is illustrated in the environmental context
by the Court’s opinion in Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Department of Natural Resources.182 There, the Court struck down a Michigan
law prohibiting private landfills from accepting out-of-county waste as a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.183 In responding to Michigan’s
argument that the law was necessary to allow counties to dispose of waste
safely, the Court provided Michigan with some advice about how to achieve
that goal: “Michigan could attain that objective without discriminating
between in- and out-of-state waste. Michigan could, for example, limit the
amount of waste that landfill operators may accept each year.”184 Third,
because environmental cases often involve challenges to long-delayed
government action or less-than-exemplary private and corporate conduct,
courts may have many opportunities to inform the public regarding the
inactivity of its representative government and the bad behavior of some of
its corporate citizens.
The analysis for judicial rhetoric is similar to that relating to judicial
advice. To the extent that judges choose rhetoric to couch decisions in a way
(and for a purpose) that is closely tethered to the strengths and obligations of
the judiciary, this should pose little problem. For example, if the rhetoric is
aimed at enhancing the explanation of the decision, providing context for the
facts, explaining why a party acted the way it did, or providing historical
background for a political or regulatory enactment, then the rhetoric is most
likely tethered to the judicial role and therefore acceptable. On the other
hand, if the purpose of the rhetoric is not simply to enhance and
contextualize the decision but instead to act as a more subtle form of policy
chastisement, it becomes more problematic. For example, in a case involving
the Clean Water Act, if a judge were to include a paragraph describing the
state of water pollution at the time the Act was promulgated as a way of
historically contextualizing the Act, that would be far more acceptable than if
the judge were describing the current state of water pollution in a particularly
evocative fashion as a way of critiquing Congress or an executive agency for
not promulgating some law or regulation to deal with the problem.
Alternatively, it would not be appropriate for a judge to detail the
burdensome effects of an environmental regulatory program on an industry
simply for the purpose of critiquing that program as a policy matter (as
opposed to, for example, explaining how the program’s burdens motivated
the industry to sue or weighing those burdens as part of some legally required
balancing test). When judges employ rhetoric as a form of critique, they veer
dangerously close to providing pure policy advice (though in a somewhat
For an excellent catalogue and analysis of CERCLA’s many problems, see John Copeland
Nagle, CERCLA’s Mistakes, 38 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1405 (1997).
182 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
183 Id. at 355.
184 Id. at 367. The Court also observed that the state could discriminate against out-of-state
waste if it could demonstrate that “the imported waste raised health or other concerns not
presented by Michigan waste.” Id.
181

44

The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law

more subtle fashion than if the advice were simply dictated), and thus their
use of language becomes subject to the capacity, efficacy, and legitimacy
objections described above.185
Finally, it is worth noting that nothing in the foregoing discussion is
meant to bear on the content of the advice that judges should feel
encouraged to provide or the messages that judges choose to convey through
their rhetoric. In other words, nothing inherent in the judicial role speaks to
whether the content of the language chosen in environmental cases ought to
be pro-environment or pro-industry (or any other type), as opposed to the
specific forms of advice judges should provide. Whether judges choose to
include pro-environment rhetoric or pro-industry rhetoric in their opinions
will be based on the personal predilections of the judge herself.
Environmentalists might choose to try and persuade judges to employ proenvironment language, but this persuasive project will have to be framed in
the language of policy (“it is good to protect the environment because of X,
Y, and Z”) rather than in any argument rooted in the nature of the judicial
role (“because you are a judge, you should protect the environment”). This
follows from the conclusion explained below that protection of the
environment is not an inherent aspect of the judicial function.186
6.

Outcome-focused Decision-making

At its most radical level—one which would endorse the idea that
judges should reach pro-environment decisions regardless of what the legal
materials provide—this paradigm is normatively not worth much discussion.
Although protecting the environment above all other interests might be an
acceptable policy position for a citizen or political decision-maker to adopt, it
is generally not thought acceptable for judges simply to reach decisions based
on those policy preferences. As Judge Posner has put it: “Judges should
decide cases in accordance with law rather than with any express or implied
commitments that they may have made . . . . Justice under law is as
fundamental a part of the Western political tradition as democratic selfgovernment and is historically more deeply rooted, having been essentially
uncontested within the mainstream of the tradition since at least Cicero's
time.”187 If judges could completely ignore the legal authority they are called
upon to interpret and apply, then they truly would be no different than
legislators, except of course that, unlike legislators, judges are not popularly
elected.
At a somewhat weaker level, however, this paradigm becomes more
substantial. For example, what would be wrong with a judge deciding that if
he finds the traditional legal materials (e.g., text, structure, history)
substantially indeterminate, he will simply vote in the manner that would best
See text accompanying notes 174-177, supra.
See text accompanying notes 189-218, infra.
187 Buckley v. Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board, 997 F.2d 224, 227 (7th Cir. 1993).
185
186
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protect the environment? After all, this Article previously endorsed the idea
that judges can consider the possible consequences of their decisions when
reaching a decision in a difficult case.188 If a judge can consider possible
consequences, why not just allow the judge to decide based on his preferred
outcome? But there is a significant difference between a pragmatic approach
which would have courts look to the environmental consequences of their
decisions as one of many factors when deciding a case, and an approach that
would endorse pro-environment decision-making in all cases involving
significant indeterminacy. The former, in my view, stems from the fact that
judges will inevitably be influenced by their intuitions, experiences, and biases
when deciding difficult cases, and thus it makes little sense to ask them not to
consider real-world consequences. The latter, however, is a more radical
position, one that that takes protection of the environment to be an inherent
aspect of the judicial role. Such a position requires some argument or theory
specific to the environment to justify its radical approach.189
Under what circumstances would it be proper to understand
protection of the environment as an inherent part of the judicial role? One
possibility would be if there were some specific source of law—a
constitutional provision, a binding treaty,190 a statute—that obligated courts
to place a thumb on the scale of environmental protection. For instance, if
the Constitution contained a provision similar to the one found in Illinois’
Constitution, which provides that “[e]ach person has the right to a healthful
environment,”191 perhaps one could construct an argument that judges, as the
ultimate enforcers of the Constitution, must take positive acts to promote
environmental protection. The U.S. Constitution, of course, lacks any such
provision. Alternatively, if a statute directed federal judges to decide cases in
a pro-environment fashion, such a statute, depending on how it was written,
might have the same effect, assuming it did not create any separation of
powers problems. Again, no such statute exists. The closest federal statute
on the books is NEPA, which does mandate that “to the fullest extent
possible . . . the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States
shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the policies set forth
in this chapter,”192 and which could possibly be read to entrust judges with
the obligation of ensuring that environmental laws and regulations are
See text accompanying notes 138-146, supra.
In a sense, the notion that judges should decide cases in an outcome-directed fashion in
environmental cases is also an example of the first paradigm, as it is to some degree a
“special rule” for environmental law. To that extent, many of the objections to the first
paradigm, see text accompanying notes 110-129, supra, would be applicable here as well.
190 For discussion of the inclusion of the so-called “precautionary principle” in international
treaties, see Chris W. Backes & Jonathan M. Verschuuren, The Precautionary Principle in
International, European, and Dutch Wildlife Law, 9 COL. J. INT’L ENVT’L L. & POL’Y 43 (1998).
The United States has not generally endorsed the principle as a binding restraint on
American policy or activities. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary
Principle, 27 WILLIAM & MARY ENVT’L L. & POL’Y REV. 13, 14-15 & n. 7 (2002); Linda
O’Neil Coleman, 25 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 609, 624-33 (2002).
191 IL CONST. art. 11, § 2.
192 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1).
188
189
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interpreted and applied in a pro-environment fashion,193 but the Supreme
Court has long repudiated the notion that NEPA has any substantive bite,194
and Congress has failed to amend the statute in response to the Supreme
Court’s interpretation.
In addition, it might be possible to develop a theory based on
something inherent in the judicial role or the political process or some other
aspect of the American legal system in order to justify a judicial system which
actively promotes environmental values. An example from a different area
of law would be John Hart Ely’s classic representation reinforcing theory for
a system of judicial review favoring the interests of insular and discrete
minorities who are effectively precluded from full participation in the
political process.195 In his most recent work, Georgetown’s Richard Lazarus
offers some tantalizing hints toward such a theory.196 He argues, for
See, e.g., Farber, supra n. 12, at 560 (noting that the Court’s position that NEPA imposes
only procedural requirements on agencies “simply ignored the plain language of the
statute”).
194 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US 332, 350 (1989) (“Although these
[NEPA] procedures are almost certain to affect the agency's substantive decision, it is now
well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process.”); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223,
227-228 (1980) (per curiam) (NEPA only imposes procedural requirements, not substantive
ones).
195 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 87-88
(1980).
196 Although I have given it much thought, I cannot conclude with any certainty what
paradigm(s) identified in this Article Lazarus’s suggestions would fall into. He certainly
believes that courts ought to use environmental rhetoric. See n. 75, supra. At times he seems
to be arguing that courts should use different tests or apply existing tests more stringently in
environmental law cases. See Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, supra n. 11, at 206
(discussing need for “heightened judicial scrutiny” in environmental law cases). Sometimes,
he seems to be arguing only that courts ought to appreciate the true nature of environmental
harms when applying facts to law. See Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at
741 (“On other occasions . . . it may be only the legal doctrine’s application in the
environmental context that requires more careful, and different, consideration. This could
occur when the pre-existing doctrinal solution has reflected a balancing of competing values.
The balance struck may differ in light of the special weight the environmental context
suggests should be given to particular ecological values.”). Other times, he suggests that
courts should adopt new general legal standards or tests when they realize that the existing
standards fail to protect the environment. See id. (arguing the Court should rethink entire
areas of law “when the environmental dimension of a case illuminates a general doctrinal
failing”).
Finally, although Lazarus clearly says that he is not endorsing outcome-oriented
decision-making, see Lazarus, Thirty Years, supra n. 11, at 635 (“There should not always be
one answer if environmental protection is at stake; and another answer if not. Such
singularly outcome-dependent judicial reasoning could seriously undermine the law’s
essential integrity and legitimacy.”), some aspects of his work give the impression that,
however unintentionally, he does support some sort of outcome-influenced approach to
environmental decision-making. For example, after identifying a set of one hundred cases
decided between 1969 and 1999 for which it is possible to identify a pro-environment and an
anti-environment result, Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 723, Lazarus
scores the Justices on a scale of 1-100 based on how environmentally friendly their votes
reveal them to be. Id. at 722 (“A Justice is awarded one point for each pro-environmental
193
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example, that, like in civil rights cases, “heightened judicial scrutiny” is
required in environmental law cases “to safeguard the interests of those less
politically powerful (whether racial minorities or unborn future
generations).”197 This suggests that judges ought to decide cases in a proenvironment fashion to protect future generations because those
beneficiaries lack a vehicle to participate in the political process or to
otherwise protect their interests. Moreover, Lazarus argues that because of
the geographic and temporal “mismatch” of cause and effect that
characterizes ecological injury,198 and because of the exceedingly fragmented

protection outcome for which the Justice voted. The final score, referred to hereinafter as
an ‘EP’ score,’ is based on the percentage of pro-environmental votes the Justice cast out of
those cases within the 100-case sample in which that Justice participated.”). In addition to
the fact that a 1-100 scale, as a matter of tone, suggests that Justices who decide more cases
in a pro-environment fashion are doing somehow better than Justices with low scores,
Lazarus’s discussion of the trends over time suggest that there is something normatively
good about deciding cases in a pro-environment fashion regardless of the context of the
case. After showing that over time the number of Justices who have high environmental
protection (“EP”) scores has declined and the number of Justices with low EP scores has
risen, id. at 735-36, Lazarus concludes that “[t]he overall trends should be troubling for those
looking to the Supreme Court for an affirmative interest in promoting environmental
protection.” Id. at 736. See also id. at 737 (“[E]nvironmental protection concerns seem
increasingly over the past three decades to be serving a disfavored role in influencing the
Court’s outcome. The preferred outcome is one that places less rather than more weight on
the need to promote environmental protection. The Court’s decisions and the attitudes of
the individual Justices reflect increasing skepticism of the efficacy of environmental
protection goals and the various laws that seek their promotion. Even more fundamentally,
however, the Court’s rulings and the opinions and votes of the Justices suggest the relative
absence of any notion that environmental law is a distinct area of law.”). Although Lazarus
does not say that he is the kind of person who looks to the Court for such an interest, it
seems fairly implied. The language he uses suggests that judges should in fact have an
“affirmative interest in promoting environmental protection.” This is very different from
saying that judges should take into account the unique features of ecological injury when
deciding cases; the latter may in fact result in more pro-environment results, but it might not,
and the goal in any event would simply be to apply a correct understanding of the facts,
rather than to reach a particular result in any given case.
Moreover, apart from the specific language he uses, Lazarus’s analysis of the scores
also suggests an interest in outcome-focused decision-making. To the extent that Lazarus is
lamenting the increase in the number of Justices who consciously reach anti-environment
decisions, he would seem on very strong ground: there is little reason to believe that Justices
should conceive of acting anti-environmentally as part of their judicial role. But to the
extent he is lamenting the decline of Justices who consciously reach pro-environmental
decisions, his ground is shakier. Without knowing more about each case decided, there is no
reason to think that a pro-environment decision is any better than an anti-environment
decision except that it represents a pro-environment outcome. In other words, there is no
sure way of knowing whether a high EP score demonstrates that a Justice has a long history
of properly considering the unique features of ecological injury when deciding cases or
instead a long history of reaching otherwise poor decisions in order to maximize
environmental protection.
197 Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, supra n. 11, at 206.
198 See id. at 206-07 (“Environmental legal rules invariably regulate activities at one location
and/or time in order to avoid harms or confer benefits on persons or environmental
amenities at another place or time.”). See also LAZARUS, supra n. 11, at 5-28.
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nature of American legal decision-making,199 environmental law is particularly
difficult to “maintain, and to enforce over time.” 200 This, he suggests,
justifies a “substantial, engaged, and active judicial role” in protecting the
environment.201
Of these possibilities, the argument regarding future generations
would appear to have the most promise in justifying a pro-environment
judicial orientation, but even this argument falls short. Even assuming that
present generations have a responsibility to future generations to maintain
the natural environment in habitable condition,202 it is unclear why courts
should be the institution to provide the voice of those generations. For one
thing, given that many if not most adult participants in the political process,
whether active office holders or concerned citizens, likely have or plan to
have or raise children (and/or grandchildren), it is quite possible that future
generations are already adequately represented in present political processes.
Research has shown that people fear risks to their children even more than
they fear risks to themselves,203 and this fact alone may counsel against
placing even more of a thumb on the scale of future interests. Even if this
were not so, Lazarus does not explain how present day judges are equipped
to determine the precise interests of future generations and how those
interests ought to be weighed against current interests. It is certainly possible
that future generations might believe that the current generation should have
sacrificed its own enjoyment for the future, but it is also quite possible that
they will wish we enjoyed ourselves more and worried about them less.204
Absent any concrete reason to believe that future generations are in fact
underrepresented and that judges can accurately gauge their interests and
desires, the notion that judges ought to discard politically reached outcomes
on the ground that those outcomes do not adequately protect the nebulous
interests of future generations seems highly undemocratic. If the current
population decides to sacrifice the future for current enjoyment, this may be
a profoundly disturbing result for those who would have decided otherwise,
but that hardly justifies judicial intervention on behalf of those who have lost
in the political process.
199 Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, supra n. 11, at 207-08 (noting both “horizontal
fragmentation”—“between and within branches of government”—and “vertical
fragmentation”—“reflective of the Constitution’s commitment to principles of federalism,
emphasizing the limited powers of the federal government and the general authority of the
states”). See also LAZARUS, supra n. 11, at 29-42.
200 Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, supra n. 11, at 206.
201 Id.
202 See, e.g., Edith Brown Weiss, Our Rights and Obligations to Future Generations for the
Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (1990); but see Anthony D’Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to
Future Generations to Preserve the Global Environment, 84 AM. J. INT’L L. 190 (1990) (describing an
argument against recognizing such an obligation).
203 See, e.g., DAVID ROPEIK & GEORGE GRAY, RISK! A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR DECIDING
WHAT’S REALLY SAFE AND WHAT’S REALLY DANGEROUS IN THE WORLD AROUND YOU 17
(2002) (“Adults are much more afraid of risks to their children than risks to themselves.”).
204 This would be particularly true if future technological developments, including perhaps
space travel, were to make the risks we fear now less worrisome in the future.
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Additionally, two other considerations counsel strongly against the
notion that judges should vote in favor of the environment to protect future
generations. First, as Lazarus himself recognizes, the various complexities
(ecological, economic, etc.) that make it difficult to determine how best to
protect the environment also make it impossible for policymakers to apply
“bright line rules”205 in any given situation. To rely on such rules would likely
result in “environmental laws that were unduly burdensome in many
significant respects and unduly relaxed in many others, achieving the worst of
both worlds.”206 The same holds true for any bright line rule that would have
judges favor the environment whenever the legal materials prove
indeterminate. If a judge were to always vote in favor of the environment,
this would likely lead to many situations when, as Lazarus says, “valued
human activities would be curtailed for no good reason, at least in terms of
achieving environmental protection goals.”207 And since judges generally lack
expertise in environmental science or policy, they are particularly unlikely to
be able to determine when they should put a thumb on the scale for the
environment and when they should not. Furthermore, as Lazarus also notes,
since all regulations are costly, and since these costs themselves often have
“implications for human health and welfare,”208 it may be that always voting
for the environment in difficult cases will have in some significant subset of
cases a negative impact on exactly the future generations that judges would
be attempting to protect.209
Finally, recognizing a judicial obligation to protect future generations
could not logically be cabined to the environmental law context, and
therefore the recognition of such an obligation would destabilize the legal
system in deleterious ways. Almost any policy decision implicates the
interests of future generations; decisions about war and peace, management
of the economy, development of drugs and other medical technologies, the
exploration and colonization of space, and even decisions about how works
of art should be protected all have important and often unknown effects on
how future generations will experience their lives. If judges must act for
future generations in environmental law cases, then they must act for them in
nearly every legal dispute.210 There is no principled reason to draw the line at
LAZARUS, supra n. 11, at 19.
Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 27.
209 See, e.g., Breyer, supra n. 55, at 1845 (arguing against an active judicial role in the nuclear
power controversy because “one cannot reasonably argue that important health, safety, or
environmental interests lie on only one side of that debate”). Clearly, these objections are
not in themselves decisive; they demonstrate only that there would be considerable costs to
having judges act on behalf of future generations.
210 Nor would there be any reason to draw the line only at future generations, who are not
the only arguably under-represented group in the political process. For example, certainly
the citizens of other nations are under-represented in the American political process. Should
judges interpret statutes to protect that group as well? What if different groups of under205
206
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environmental cases. And this would radically change both the judicial role
and the power of accountable elected officials to make legitimate decisions
regarding the future. Do we really want unelected judges stepping in to stop
(or to order) military actions or economic reforms that have been settled on
through democratic processes, on the basis that those actions or reforms are
not in the best interest of future generations? Only if the answer to this
question is “yes” would it even be possible to think of justifying an activist
judicial role in environmental cases on the basis of the interests of future
generations.
Lazarus’s other suggestions, in my view, are not as weighty. It is
certainly true, as Lazarus says, that the “mismatch of cause and effect” of
ecological harms and the fragmentation of American lawmaking processes
make environmental protection difficult.211 As he rightly puts it, it is “a
challenge for any legal regime to impose significant costs on the here and
now for the benefit of the there and then.”212 And it is also no doubt the
case that the “structural bias within our lawmaking institutions” which “favor
. . . government’s acting more slowly and incrementally” make it very difficult
to deal with quickly developing and often changing environmental
problems.213 But neither of these facts justify incorporating environmental
protection as an inherent aspect of the judicial role. Instead, they justify the
development of legal mechanisms that are fine-tuned to handle the difficult
problems posed by environmental law, including the delegation of
environmental protection responsibilities to agencies, which can react more
quickly (even if not always quickly enough) than legislatures, the
federalization of environmental law to prevent spillover effects among states
and ensure the optimal amount of environmental protection,214 and the
development of novel methods for monitoring and adjusting ecological
protection measures to adapt to changing conditions.215 These characteristics
of ecological injury and lawmaking institutions may also justify courts acting
under previously established legal mechanisms to protect the environment in
emergencies, as they do when they issue injunctions to prohibit irreversible
environmental damage,216 or the creation of relaxed rules of judicial access to
allow plaintiffs to sue for environmental harm even when there is some
geographical or temporal distance between the plaintiff and the source of the
represented foreign citizens would have different views about how a statute should be
interpreted?
211 See generally LAZARUS, supra n. 11, at 5-43.
212 Lazarus, Judging Environmental Law, supra n. 11, at 207.
213 LAZARUS, supra n. 11, at 32-33.
214 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86YALE L. J. 1196, 1215 (1977).
215 For a good example, see Bradley Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 938-947 (2002)
(advocating changes to NEPA to better monitor environmental effects and encourage
adaptation to environmental changes).
216 See n. 157, supra (describing application of test for injunctive relief in environmental cases,
as an example of paradigm #3).
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harm.217 But these latter judicial actions are examples of courts faithfully
applying facts to law and designing legal tests and standards that are
grounded in real world understandings, rather than in any notion that courts
ought to vote to protect the environment regardless of the case’s legal
context. The latter position—which is tantamount to saying that unelected
judges should second guess the decisions of the elected branches in
environmental cases—is simply inconsistent with the judicial role and
unjustified by any unique characteristics of environmental law.218
7.

Ignore Environmental Aspects of the Case.

Rejection of this paradigm in its pure form follows from what has
been said already. Although courts should not create special legal rules for
environmental cases or modify general rules for application in environmental
cases, they should pay strong attention to the factual nuances of
environmental cases, including the remarkable features of ecological injury,
when applying facts to law, and they should consider the environmental realworld effects of their decisions, at least to some degree, when interpreting
statutes and constitutional provisions and otherwise formulating general legal
rules. Moreover, judges should feel free to employ environmentally related
rhetoric and advice in their opinions when that language is closely tied to
their role, strengths, and obligations as judges. To the extent that these
activities constitute paying attention to the environmental aspects of cases
before them, it follows that courts should not, as a general rule, ignore the
environmental aspects of the cases they hear. Adopting this paradigm would
have courts ignore completely the environmental effects of their decisions,
thus entirely disengaging the lawmaking and interpretive process from real
world considerations, and it would require courts essentially to misapply
facts—to treat environmental injuries like any other type of injury—which
would simply constitute a mischaracterization of the judicial role.
8.

Chemical Manufacturer’s Association Reconsidered

Having worked through the benefits and drawbacks of each of the
seven paradigms as a general matter, the Article can now return to the
Chemical Manufacturer’s Association case to consider whether the Court’s
approach to the case was proper, at least in terms of the Court’s treatment or
non-treatment of the unique environmental aspects of the case. Initially, it is
worth noting that the Court correctly chose the Chevron test as the relevant
general test for evaluating the agency’s interpretation of the statute. That
test, developed the year before in an environmental case, clearly provided the
framework for decision, and it would have been improper, for reasons
217 See text accompanying notes 163-165, supra (describing Lazarus’s persuasive critique of
the Court’s crabbed interpretation of Article III in Lujan).
218 One way to look at this paradigm is that it would single out environmental law for special
treatment—albeit special negative treatment—and thus is an example of the first paradigm and
subject to all the critiques of that paradigm, see text accompanying notes 110-129, supra.
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catalogued above,219 for the Court to have decided counter-intuitively to
relegate Chevron to non-environmental cases and to develop a new test for
environmental cases. This would have been the case even if the original
Chevron test had been articulated in a non-environmental case. Likewise, for
reasons given above, the Court was right not to apply the Chevron test
differently in environmental cases than in other types of cases.220 Finally, as
noted above,221 it may have been quite appropriate for the Court to have
called attention in its opinion to the costs imposed by Congress by its
ambiguous phrasing of section 301(l) and even to chastise Congress for these
costs.
The more difficult questions involve (1) whether the Court should
have crafted a generally-applicable Chevron sub-rule regarding agency creation
or recognition of exceptions to regulatory requirements, based on the Court’s
evaluation of the environmental costs of such exceptions; and (2) whether
the Court should have concluded, based on the costs of those exceptions,
either that section 301(l) unambiguously precluded the FDF variance or that
the agency’s interpretation of 301(l) (to allow such variances) was
unreasonable. In my view, the Court properly did neither of these things.
Moreover, although the case is quite close, I argue below that the majority of
the Court reached the proper result, although it could have, in one instance,
paid closer attention to the unique nature of ecological injury.
It is worth considering the second set of questions first: Is the extent
of the possible harms from granting an exception relevant to either step of
the Chevron analysis? To answer this question, it is necessary at the outset to
consider the nature of the FDF variance. It is both similar to the other
exceptions contained in section 301 and different from those exceptions. To
reiterate, section 301(c) authorized the EPA to “modify” the emission
limitations relevant to a plant’s “class or category” if those limitations (which
were set, along with the definition of the classes and categories themselves,
by EPA, after a notice and comment period) in cases of economic
hardship,222 and section 301(g) authorized EPA to “modify” a limitation
when doing so would not harm water quality.223 The FDF variance, by
contrast, was created by the agency by regulation to give plants the
opportunity to demonstrate that they were improperly classified in the first
place, and that because of “factors fundamentally different from those
considered by EPA in setting the limitation,”224 the plant should be subject to
somewhat more lenient emission limitations. The FDF variance, as the
dissent pointed out, is similar to the 301(c) and 301(g) modifications, in that
it provides an individual plant with the opportunity to avoid the emission
See text accompanying notes 110-129, supra.
See text accompanying notes 129-130, supra.
221 See text accompanying notes 105-106, supra.
222 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c).
223 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g).
224 Chemical Manufacturer’s Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 121.
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limitations that would otherwise be applicable to it.225 However, the FDF
variance is also unlike the 301(c) and 301(g) modifications, as the majority
pointed out, because it is a “corrective mechanism”226 for limitations that
were improperly framed in the first place rather than an excusal for correctly
framed limitations. As the majority put it: “An FDF variance does not
excuse compliance with a correct requirement, but instead represents an
acknowledgement that not all relevant factors were taken sufficiently into
account in framing that requirement originally, and that those relevant
factors, properly considered, would have justified—indeed, required—the
creation of a subcategory for the discharger in question.”227
The first Chevron question is whether the term “modify” in section
301(l)—which, again to reiterate, provided that “[t]he Administrator may not
modify any requirement of this section as it applies to any [toxic]
pollutant”—unambiguously precluded the agency from granting FDF
variances for toxic emissions as well as 301(c) and 301(g) modifications. The
question is undoubtedly a close one. On the one hand, it might be possible
to read “modify” to refer to any change at all, no matter how justified or
minor, to the initial emission limitation standards issued by the agency. But
on the other hand, as the majority pointed out,228 this position is difficult to
square with section 307(b)(2) of the statute, which allows EPA to revise
certain standards if revision is justified by changes in technology, operating
methods, or other relevant factors.229 Even those who challenged the
agency’s authority to grant FDF exemptions conceded that 301(l) did not
prohibit 307(b)(2) revisions.230 As such, it is hard to claim that 301(l)
unambiguously precluded the agency from granting FDF variances.
Although the dissent is correct that FDF variances differ from 307(b)(2)
revisions in significant respects, most notably that 307(b)(2) revisions are
subject to notice and comment requirements and are category-based rather
than plant-based, thus increasing the chance that EPA will set more stringent
standards under that process than the FDF process,231 the two processes are
nonetheless similar in that both allow the agency to revise the emission
limitation standards to reflect the true circumstances of the plant or plants in
question. Whether the two processes are so different that 301(l) should be
read to prohibit one but not the other is simply unclear; the language and the
structure of the statute, as the majority argues, is ambiguous.

See id. at 138 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The only view of FDF variances consistent with
the scheme of the Clean Water Act is that they are individual exceptions that soften the
hardship of general rules.”).
226 Id. at 130.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 126
229 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(2).
230 Chemical Manufacturer’s Ass’n, 470 U.S. at 126 (noting that the National Resources Defense
Council “does and must concede” that 301(l) “cannot be read to forbid every change in the
toxic waste standards”).
231 See id. at 155-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Although I reach the conclusion that 301(l) does not unambiguously
preclude FDF variances with some difficulty, the more important point is
that the potential harm which could ensue from granting an exemption is not
relevant to the legal analysis. Justice Marshall argued in dissent that the
harm was relevant, noting that exceptions “are inappropriate where small
errors could lead to irreversible or catastrophic costs,” and that because
“[e]nvironmental problems often present thresholds . . . the cost of a
relatively small mistake is very high.”232 Citing Chevron, Justice Marshall then
concluded from this that, “[t]he decision of when exceptions are required . . .
is, in the first instance, one for Congress to make” and that “[i]t is an
administrative decision only where Congress has left a gap for the agency to
fill.” But this simply begs the question of whether Congress has indeed
unambiguously precluded the agency from granting the FDF variance.
Marshall argued that the statute clearly did preclude the agency from granting
the variance, but that analysis turned on his analysis of the language,
structure, and legislative history of the statute, rather than resting
independently on the possible harm that granting an exception might
cause.233 Likewise, the majority’s conclusion reached above—that 301(l) does
not clearly preclude FDF variances because it clearly does not preclude the
very similar (though not identically similar) 307(b)(2) revision process—rests
on the text of the statute and not on the nature of the harm caused by
recognizing exceptions to environmental regulations.234
The second question under Chevron is whether the agency’s
interpretation of 301(l) was reasonable. To begin with, it is very unclear what
the precise scope of this inquiry is supposed to be and whether it has any real
teeth under current judicial practice. As Gary Lawson has observed:
“[A]lthough courts have not articulated very well the standard(s) that they are
applying at step two of Chevron, agencies very seldom lose at that stage of the
analysis. Courts generally affirm agencies at step two in cursory fashion. . . .
In the infrequent cases in which agencies lose at step two, the agency
interpretations typically either fail completely to advance the goals of the
underlying statute . . . or are so bizarre that close analysis is unnecessary.”235
The second step of Chevron is particularly empty in cases (like Chevron itself) in
which the step one inquiry is framed as whether a statute is ambiguous as
between two possible interpretations;236 if the court decides that the statute is
ambiguous as between the two possible interpretations, it is hard to see how
Id. at 159 & n.19.
See id. at 139-152.
234 See text accompanying notes 228-229, supra. It is worth noting that if the court had been
interpreting the statute itself, rather than deciding whether the statute was ambiguous, it
might have more appropriately considered the potential harm that could have resulted from
construing the statute to allow FDF variances.
235 GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 517 (3d. ed. 2004) (citations omitted).
236 In Chevron, the relevant question was whether the phrase “stationary source” in the Clean
Air Act either did or did not clearly preclude the agency from employing the “bubble” test
for emissions. In Chemical Manufacturer’s Association, the question was whether 301(l) either
did or did not preclude the agency from granting the FDF variance.
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the Court would then decide that adopting one of those interpretations is
unreasonable. If the step two inquiry is really intended to be this
perfunctory, then clearly the extent of the potential harm posed by granting
an FDF variance would not be relevant to determining whether the agency’s
position in Chemical Manufacturer’s Association was a reasonable one.
Assuming, however, that the Chevron step two reasonableness inquiry
is a broader, more substantive one, then perhaps the best argument that the
agency’s interpretation was not reasonable, based on the unique nature of
ecological injury, would be something like Justice Marshall’s observations in
dissent regarding the important substantive differences between the FDF
variance procedure and the 307(b) revision procedure. Marshall argued that
the FDF procedure was far less protective of the environment than the
307(b) procedure because the latter requires the agency to group together all
similarly situated plants and set the emissions limitations at the level
determined by the “capability of the ‘best’ performer.”237 As Marshall put it:
The FDF variance procedure leads to substantive results that
are different in . . . fundamental ways from those attained
through the rulemaking for categories of dischargers
contemplated in § 307(b). First, it is less protective of the
environment. If, for example, a discharger shows that its
production processes—and, as a result, its costs of
compliance—are significantly different from those taken into
account in setting the categorical standards, that discharger
would be eligible for an FDF variance, and EPA could set a
new requirement based on the applicant’s peculiar situation. .
. . It may turn out, however, that there are many other
dischargers in the same situation, and that all of these
dischargers use production processes that make pollution
control possible at a much lower cost. If EPA took into
account the production processes of these more efficient
dischargers—as it presumably would have to do if it
proceeded through rulemaking on a categorical scale—it
would set a requirement far more stringent than that adopted
as part of the FDF variance mechanism.238
The argument here might go that since EPA could have used the
307(b) revision procedure to fix any inequities created by improperly framed
limitation standards, it is unreasonable for the agency to also interpret the
Chemical Manufacturer’s Association, 470 U.S. at 157 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id. at 156-57. Marshall continued: “In the aggregate, if EPA defines a new pretreatment
subcategory through rulemaking, the [“Best Available Technology”]-level pollution control
requirement of each discharger would be determined by reference to the capability of the
‘best’ performer. In contrast, if EPA provides individual variances to each plant in this
group, only one discharger would have a requirement based on the capability of the best
performer—the best performer itself. The others would necessarily be subject to less
stringent standards.” Id. at 157.
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statute to allow it to use a much more streamlined and less environmentally
protective method (the FDF variance) of achieving the same goal. Part of
this argument is necessarily the notion that allowing a plant to use a level of
technology less protective of the environment than it might otherwise have
to use under a different procedure is a significant harm that the agency has a
responsibility to avoid. Framed this way, the potentially catastrophic and
irreversible nature of ecological injury becomes relevant to the legal question
in the case.
Because the Court did appear to engage in some substantive, noncursory analysis of the reasonableness of the agency’s interpretation, framing
the inquiry as whether the “FDF variances threaten to frustrate the goals and
operation of the statutory scheme,”239 the Court should have mentioned and
discussed, at least briefly, the difference, in terms of environmental injury,
between the 307(b) procedure and the FDF procedure in determining the
reasonableness of the agency’s position.240 Such a discussion would have
enriched the Court’s opinion and rendered it more persuasive. Nonetheless,
several factors pointed to by the Court persuasively establish that the
agency’s interpretation was in fact reasonable, even given the differences
between the two procedures in terms of their environmental impact. These
factors include the limited and circumscribed nature of the FDF variance,241
the cost and difficulty of establishing subcategories through the regulatory
process,242 the flexibility provided by the FDF variance procedure,243 and the
extremely limited number of FDF variances actually granted by the agency.244
Although the Court could have been more persuasive if it had explicitly
weighed these factors against the slight decrease in environmental protection
resulting from the agency’s occasional use of the FDF variance instead of the
more costly and complicated revision procedure, the Court decision was
nonetheless correct.
Returning now to the first question posed above, perhaps the Court
should not have even applied the Chevron two-step framework to the agency’s
interpretation at all, and should have instead adopted something like an
“exception exception” to the Chevron doctrine which would reserve for courts
(rather than agencies) primary interpretive authority with regard to
exceptions found in regulatory statutes. Given that Chevron is probably not
statutorily or constitutionally based but instead best understood, in the words
of Barron and Kagan, as “a judicial construction, reflecting implicit policy

Id. at 129
The Court did mention that under § 307 the EPA could create a subcategory for each
FDF source, but this argument did not address the notice and comment procedure required
under § 307 that would, in Justice Marshall’s view, potentially result in broader categories.
Compare id. at 131 with id. at 158 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241 See id. at 132 n. 24 (describing the FDF variance).
242 See id.
243 See id. at 133.
244 See id. at 124, n. 12
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judgments about what interpretive practices make for good government,”245
the Court would certainly be within its rights to tweak the doctrine somewhat
if it thought that an “exception exception” was justified by some pragmatic
concern. If the Court had adopted such an exception, then it would have
been obligated to reach its own interpretation of section 301, rather than
engaging in the more limited inquiry of deciding whether the statute was
ambiguous. Given that substantial arguments exist in favor of looking to real
world consequences as part of the interpretive process,246 a Court progressing
in such a fashion might have been justified in considering the nature of
ecological injury when determining whether 301(l) should have been read to
bar FDF variances as well as 301(c) and 301(g) modifications.
None of the most prominent rationales for the Chevron doctrine,
however, would justify carving out a special rule for exceptions to regulatory
statutes. If the doctrine is understood as an assumption about congressional
intent—that Congress intends courts to defer to ambiguous agency
interpretations of ambiguous statutes247—there seems little reason to assume
that Congress would also intend for courts to apply such an idiosyncratic
exception. Such an assumption would essentially build one speculative
fiction upon another. If Chevron is understood instead as a doctrine that
promotes expert decision-making and/or political accountability,248 those
rationales would support deference in the exception context just as strongly
as in other contexts. Indeed, it is easy to see how the rationales play out in
Chemical Manufacturer’s itself: the agency knows better than the Court the
importance of having a relatively low cost safety valve mechanism for fixing
misclassifications, and if the public thought that the agency had too broadly
interpreted the statute, it could have held the President and his
administration politically accountable, something it would have had no
means of doing if the Court had interpreted the statute itself.
Perhaps one could advance the following “agency capture” argument
in favor of an “exception exception”: (1) exceptions contained in regulatory
statutes generally favor public interests over the private interests of regulated
industries; (2) federal agencies are generally captured by the industries they
regulate;249 (3) therefore federal agencies will be biased to interpret exceptions
in a manner favorable to private industry and unfavorable to the public
Barron & Kagan, supra n. 135, at 212.
See text accompanying notes 137-146, supra.
247 See Merrill & Hickman, supra n. 62, at 870-73.
248 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (“Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government.”).
249 On capture theory, see, e.g., Merrill, supra n. 131; Richard Stewart, Reformation of American
Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1713 (1995) (“It has become widely accepted, not
only by public interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges, and even by some
agency members, that the comparative overrepresentation of regulated or client interests in
the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.”)
(footnotes omitted)
245
246

58

The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law

interest; and thus (4) agencies should not be entrusted with primary
interpretive authority with respect to statutory exceptions. Although this
argument certainly has some force, ultimately it proves too much. Almost all
agency interpretations, regardless of whether they concern exceptions,
procedural issues, or substantive requirements, have the potential to favor
the interests of regulated industries over competing concerns. If courts are
going to interpret the exception sections of statutes themselves as a means of
countering agency capture, they should probably interpret the rest of the
statutes themselves as well. All in all, there seems to be no reason to single
out exceptions from the perspective of which institution should possess
primary interpretive authority over statutes.
Professor Lazarus criticizes the majority’s opinion in Chemical
Manufacturer’s Association and praises the dissent. In his view, Justice
Marshall’s opinion “illustrates the proper use of environmental concerns in
legal analysis of an issue of administrative law,” because it “apprehends the
relevancy for statutory interpretation of the possibility of ‘small errors’
leading to ‘irreversible or catastrophic results’—a typical feature in
environmental problems.”250 Marshall’s dissent, according to Lazarus,
properly “responded to the environmental context within which the
administrative law issue arose and discerned how that context should affect
the issue’s resolution.”251 Justice White’s majority opinion, however, “falls
short,”252 because for him, “[t]he environmental protection aspects of the
case played no apparent role of independent significance.”253
In my view, Lazarus’s criticism of the majority opinion is overstated.
As the above discussion has suggested, the Court was largely correct in its
analysis of the case, and its discussion was impoverished only slightly by its
failure to consider the remarkable features of ecological injury. Justice White
rightly ignored those features when determining that the statute was
ambiguous under Chevron step one. And although he might have considered
the potential harm that could ensue from a wrongly granted exemption as
part of the Chevron step-two reasonableness inquiry, the Court’s conclusion
on that inquiry was nonetheless correct. In sum, despite the remarkable
nature of ecological injury, the environmental protection aspects of Chemical
Manufacturer’s Association rightly played little role of independent significance
in the resolution of the dispute presented to the Court.

Lazarus, Restoring What’s Environmental, supra n. 11, at 742. Lazarus also praises the dissent
for acknowledging “the relevancy for the judicial interpretive function of the fact that
because ‘[e]nvironmental problems often present thresholds,’ ‘the cost of a relatively small
mistake is very high.’” Id.
251 Id. at 712.
252 Id. at 740.
253 Id. at 712.
250

59

The (Non)Uniqueness of Environmental Law

IV.

Conclusion

When a judge sees that the next case on her docket is an
environmental law case, should she immediately say to herself: “Aha, this is
an environmental case! I better think differently about this case than all of
the other cases that I consider”? For the most part, the answer to this
question is “no.” It is true that ecological harms are in some ways quite
remarkable, and judges have a responsibility to acknowledge and understand
those remarkable features when they decide environmental law cases. And it
is also true that courts should consider the environmental consequences of
their decisions, among other kinds of consequences, and among a number of
other relevant factors, when they reach their decisions and frame rules of
general application. Nonetheless, for the most part the theme of the Article
has been that very often the Court need not consider the remarkable features
of environmental injury when deciding issues of environmental law. Courts
have no basis for creating special rules to govern environmental law cases or
for modifying existing legal rules in those cases. They should not vote to
protect the environment whenever the legal materials are somewhat
indeterminate or otherwise act as though protection of the environment is
one of their judicial responsibilities. Many environmental law cases involve
interpretation of statutes that are clear enough to preclude any need to resort
to independent consideration of the nature of ecological injury, or review of
agency action that is deferential enough to make consideration of those
features unnecessary. Resolution of environmental law disputes frequently
calls for nothing more than application of general principles of law that
themselves are derived without much or any consideration of the remarkable
features of ecological injury.
The point of the Article, however, is emphatically not to suggest that
“environmental law” should not exist as a separate legal category. Saying that
judges often do not need to think much about the environment to resolve
environmental law cases implies nothing about whether legislators and
administrators need to think about the unique challenges of environmental
protection when framing legislation, promulgating regulations, and taking
other administrative action to safeguard the environment. Nor does it
suggest that students, teachers, journalists, or voters who naturally think of
environmental law as a separate category of law because of its subject matter
should somehow change the way they conceptualize the topic.
Environmental law addresses a unique set of problems and seeks to protect a
unique set of resources, and those facts alone suffice to set the field apart as
an area of inquiry and study. 254 But making policy is different from deciding
cases, and the fact that policymakers and the citizens who hold them
accountable should pay careful attention to the unique features of ecological
injury does not mean that judges need always do the same.
For an excellent discussion of the uniqueness of “environmental law” from a non-courtcentered perspective, see generally Tarlock, supra n. 1.
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